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Listen to my radio show, Alternative Visions, on PRN.FM, the progressive radio network, wednesday 2pm eastern time, when I discuss with Ellen Brown the Public Banking Solution to the economic crisis in the US. Ellen and I discuss the history of public banking initiatives, as well as recently revealed plans by the US and UK governments to prepare to use average depositors’ savings in banks to bail out banks in the next crisis. Already employed in Cyprus and publicly considered in the Eurozone, the US and UK are making similar preparations, it appears.

The global financial system has not stabilized. The Federal Reserve in the US and other central banks continue to pump hundreds of billions monthly, and tens of trillions of dollars, pounds, euros and yen into their economies. The outcome has been mostly to fuel new speculative financial bubbles in stocks, junk bonds, land prices, currencies and derivatives. The next banking crisis will prove far worse than 2008-09. ‘Bail ins’ (i.e. taking depositors’ savings and converting them to worthless bank stock) is being considered as potential options by government and bankers alike to bail out the banks again.

Ellen and I discuss as well the recent initiative to reduce student loan rates to 0.75% instead of current 6.8% as a solution to the growing student debt crisis. Ellen’s new forthcoming book, ‘The Public Banking Solution’ is also a topic of discussion.

Introducing the show, I once again discuss the latest in deficit cutting maneuvers in the US, and specifically the latest refusal by Apple Computer to pay any taxes on $126 billion in offshore profits. How is Apple’s tax avoidance maneuvers related to the deficit issue in the US? Listen in and find out.

The show is archived and downloadable at: http://prn.fm/shows/political-shows/alternative-visions/#axzz2U5Yreaoh

Tune in to my radio show, Alternative Visions, on the Progressive Radio Network, PRN.FM, on wednesday, May 22, 2pm eastern, when I and economist Rick Wolff discuss the US economy. Wolff and I are both members of the newly formed ‘Green shadow Cabinet’ (Wolff as shadow ‘Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers’ and I as chair of shadow Federal Reserve). We’ll discuss the current state of the US and global economy, whether recovery is now really under way, directions in deficit cutting/austerity, the Fed, and global developments in Europe, China and elsewhere. (Access the show, or archive after wednesday, from the icon on this blog’s sidebar, or from my website, http://www.kyklosproductions.com similar icon on its sidebar).

(Next week: Interview with Green Shadow Cabinet ‘Treasury Secretary, Ellen Brown, on May 22)

Last week, George W. Bush’s presidential library was dedicated. The Media were there in droves. So too were presidents Obama and Bill Clinton. They were all buddy-buddy, smiling, shaking hands and mutually jovial in the realization, no doubt, of the successful implementation of their very similar policies of the past 20 years–policies which, of course, have their ultimate origins in their common policy ancestor, Ronald Reagan.

The policy differences between the three (and Reagan) are far less than the similarities. It’s all just a matter of degree and emphasis. GW Bush, however, represents an extreme in that common spectrum. The damages to the US and global economy by the Bush regime have been almost immeasurable, and continue to this day, as they will for years to come.

Liberal economist, Paul Krugman, briefly recounted some of the more momentous damages in his recent column. But a brief column cannot do justice to the full scope and severity of George W. Bush’s toxic legacies.

This writer wrote a lengthier assessment back in December 2008 of the Bush Ten Toxic Legacies (a short list). Given all the hoopla about Bush and his library dedication (and the accompanying attempt to resurrect his reputation surrounding the event), I thought it was appropriate for readers to review in more depth and detail just what George W. Bush had done to destroy the US economy and US society, written by yours truly in December 2008. That assessment is as follows:

“GEORGE W. BUSH’s TEN TOXIC LEGACIES:

“Bush’s First Economic Legacy: The Mountain of Debt

During Bush’s two terms in office more than $3 trillion have been poured down the black hole of wars in Iraq and the Middle East. More than $5 trillion has been served up in tax cuts for corporations and the wealthiest 10% households in the U.S.

According to U.S. Federal Reserve Bank data, since Bush assumed office in January 2001 Government debt levels have risen by more than $3 trillion. But that’s only the total as of the end of March 2008. It does not yet include the cost of bank bailouts this past September: $300 billion for Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, $85 billion for the insurance company giant, AIG, and the infamous $700 billion ‘TARP’ (Troubled Asset Relief Program) bailout at the close of the month. The September bailouts thus amount to another minimum $1.085 trillion.

The above $1.085 also doesn’t include pending bailouts by the U.S. government’s FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.), the agency that is tasked with closing down failed banks and reimbursing depositors. Banks like IndyMac and others. As of the end of September, The FDIC has only $35 billion in available funds remaining for additional bailouts. It is potentially liable for 8,600 banks in the U.S. with deposits and assets totaling $13.3 trillion. It expects 800-1000 regional and smaller banks to fail in coming months. Its bailout this past summer of Indymac Bank cost $8 billion alone. After the November elections, it will have to ask Congress for hundreds of billions, and perhaps even a trillion or more, in additional funding to cover bank failures yet to come. And that’s only banks! What happens when large hedge funds or a large pension fund goes under? Will the Government bail them out as well? It seems anyone with a corporate balance sheet is now eligible for a Government-Taxpayer income transfer.

For example, non-financial corporations have already begun to queue up at the bailout trough. The three big US auto companies have just been handed $25 billion by Congress, in a separate bill that quietly slipped by the public and press in September, amidst the cacophonous wailings for bailout assistance by banks and financial institutions. Even foreign auto makers doing business in the U.S. are now demanding a piece of that pork as well. Like hogs in a pen, Corporate America’s lobbyists, financial and non-financial alike, noisily rush to the fence as the farmer approaches with his slop-pail of goodies. And it’s only the beginning. Corporate defaults are expected to rise tenfold in the next eighteen months, according to Standard & Poor’s, the corporate rating agency.

But there’s still more trillions in this Bush mountain of debt legacy picture. Between 2002 and 2007 the ‘subprime’ mortgage loan crisis was created by the Bush administration. Total mortgage debt in the U.S. more than doubled, rising from $5 trillion in 2001 to more than $11 trillion in 2007. The poor quality subprime and other risky mortgage loans amounted to approximately $2 trillion of that $6 trillion.

The Bush administration was forewarned time and again from 2003 on, by regulators and elected officials alike, at both federal and state levels, that the subprime situation was a time-bomb. Bush not only did nothing but actively discouraged federal intervention. The Bush administration officials at the Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC, in particular were instructed to look the other way as Banks set up ‘shadow banks’ operated off their regulated books. The shadow banks, called Structured Investment Vehicles, or SIVs, served as the trash receptacles in which various securitized bad subprime mortgage bonds were stuffed. Cooking separate books like this, off ‘balance-sheet’ as it is called, was precisely what CEOs and CFOs at Enron went to jail for a few years earlier. But similar behavior at banks and financial institutions in the case of subprimes was apparently not a problem for the Bush administration. When certain investigators and prosecutors got too close or appeared to have too much success, such as ex-New York attorney-general and governor, Eliot Spitzer…well… the FBI found a way to remove him from the scene.

Bush directly contributed to the subprime bust and financial crisis in yet another way. This required the active assistance of Federal Reserve (FED) Chairman, Alan Greenspan. In 2003 Greenspan was awaiting reconfirmation of his position at the FED by the Bush administration. The economic recovery from the 2001 recession had stalled by 2003. After a weak recovery in 2002, job growth was declining once again, even though jobs had still not recovered to pre-2001 levels. Bush was intent on going to War in Iraq. And 2004 elections were but a year away. The economy needed a special boost.

Bush-Greenspan struck a partnership that led directly to the subprime bust. Here’s how it happened: Greenspan and the FED accommodated Bush by lowering interest rates to 1% and then keeping them there far longer than was economically justified in any sense. The Bush-Greenspan strategy paid off for both partners. Super low interest rates produced a housing and commercial property driven economic boom from 2003 to 2006. Greenspan was awarded with reappointment as FED chairman by Bush in spring 2004 and Bush got his economic over-stimulus in time for the November 2004 elections. Financial speculators, banks and the mortgage industry raked in superprofits. They were able, as a result of Greenspan policies, to borrow virtually free money from the FED, which they then ‘leveraged’ to purchase ten times more volume of subprime mortgage bonds. Some of the more aggressive Investment banks, like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, leveraged themselves 30 times or more. Greenspan’s 1% interest rate policy helped fuel the speculative excesses in the mortgage industry that created the subprime boom of 2003-06. When the FED finally began to raise rates again in 2005-06 it provoked the subprime bust of 2006-07. The end result of it all was a record housing price spike from 2004 to 2006, followed in turn by the consequent subprime mortgage price collapse.

In the process of borrowing for leveraging and housing speculation, banks and financial institutions added roughly $8 trillion in new debt during the first seven years of Bush’s term–$6 trillion of that during the subprime speculative boom period of 2003-07.

But there’s still another $ trillion to account for. That’s the amount of new credit card debt that American middle and working class consumers also took on since 2001. It is a lie and misrepresentation that consumers have been increasing their credit card debt in order to engage in spending on luxury and unnecessary items. Most of credit card debt has been taken up in order to pay for big ticket necessities, like college education for children, payment for medical bills their employer insurance plans no longer cover, for medical services by those no longer able to afford insurance at all, for basic transportation needs, for general cost of living by retirees no longer able to survive on social security, and so on. The credit card has replaced the annual wage increase that many employers used to but no longer give. It has substituted for wage increases that unions, now but a shell of their former selves, used to negotiate but no longer can. Credit cards are now relied upon by the more than 40 million workers who used to have full time permanent jobs but now have to make due with lower paid part time or temporary work; and by the more than 8 million workers whose once decent paying manufacturing jobs have gone offshore and have had to accept lower paid service jobs.

To the $3 trillion in government debt was thus added $6 trillion in household mortgage debt, $8 trillion in banking debt, another $1 trillion in new consumer credit card debt, and $3.5 trillion in additional non-financial business debt. A total of more than $21 trillion in accumulated debt of various kinds over the course of Bush’s term in office. That’s a stack of $500 bills 3,297 miles high; or, roughly the distance from New York City to London.

Second Economic Legacy: Financial System Collapse

The ‘unwinding’ of the $21 trillion in net debt accumulated during the Bush administration is the direct, root cause of the current financial crisis.

The write-downs and write-offs by banks and other financial institutions, the bankruptcies by companies and consumers, the losses of home values, the foreclosures, etc.—all represent the ‘unwinding’ of that record level of $21 trillion new debt accumulated since Bush took office. The September bank bailouts, from Fannie Mae to TARP, represent an effort by the US government on behalf of banks and financial institutions to transfer the cost of the banks’ $8 trillion debt unwinding from their banking friends to the general taxpayer. More specifically, the September bailouts represent a strategy by Finance Capital and America’s corporate elite to shift a major portion of this debt from their corporate balance sheets to the ‘public balance sheet’ and taxpayer.

But the bank bailouts will not stop the debt unwinding. They do not address the fundamental causes of housing and commercial property price collapse underway since the beginning of the year and now accelerating. Housing prices have yet to fall another 20-30%, and new phases or stages of the financial crisis will continue to emerge. Furthermore, housing deflation will continue to spill over to the commercial property market, to the stock markets that have yet to fall another 20% as well, and eventually to producer and consumer prices and wages should the recession prove deep and long. The bailouts only relieve the banks of their share of the pain of that collapse. Bailouts like those enacted in September are designed primarily to transfer the costs of the crisis—from big banks, financial institutions, and other corporations and their investors to the general taxpayer, worker, and consumer. But shifting the ‘bad’ debt from private to public balance sheets does not eliminate it. The only thing settled by the bailouts—TARP, Fannie Mae, AIG, and others—is who will pay for the crisis, not how to end the crisis.

Once a fundamental debt-driven financial crisis gains momentum it is not easy to stop. The US Federal Reserve’s strategy has been to throw ‘liquidity’ at it. Since December 2007 the FED has committed nearly a trillion dollars in special and emergency loans—to no avail. Time and again the FED has upped the ante—and the crisis has deteriorated further. It is amazing that the current chairman of the FED, Ben Bernanke, has not learned that throwing liquidity at the problem, i.e. a money supply solution, is not working after a year of such repeated attempts. The problem is not the balance sheets of banks and financial institutions; the problem is the ‘balance sheets’ and insufficient incomes of workers, consumers and homeowners—i.e. a demand side problem. The financial crisis is not a liquidity crisis. It is a solvency crisis. It is a general systemic crisis and a deepening crisis of confidence in the financial system itself.

The debt-driven financial implosion is thus the second major economic legacy of the Bush administration. What Bush has left the nation is a classic Debt-Deflation crisis that has resulted in a near freeze up of the entire financial system. The last time this occurred was 1929-34, and before that in the 1870s and the 1890s. Moreover, the Bush legacy of financial collapse is not finished. It will continue to reverberate and make itself felt for years to come.

Third Economic Legacy: Epic Recession

The direct consequence of financial crisis and implosion is a general ‘credit crunch’. A ‘credit crunch’ is a system-wide severe and sharp contraction of credit. A credit contraction has been progressively growing in the economy since last January. A credit contraction occurs when banks and financial institutions have, or expect to have, significant losses due to bad loans and investments, and therefore are increasingly reluctant to loan out reserves they may have on hand. They are uncertain they may need the cash on hand and reserves to cover anticipated losses and prevent becoming technically bankrupt if their losses exceed their reserves. Over the past year financial institutions have step by step tightened their lending terms. But even the slow down in lending hit a wall and entered a new, more intense and serious stage with the financial events of September—i.e. a credit crunch. In the wake of the collapsing of Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, Merrill, AIG and others, in September credit market after market began to freeze up and virtually shut down

From housing and commercial property markets, to industrial loans, to municipal and corporate bonds, to commercial paper, and even markets in which banks loan to each other, such as Libor—all began to shut down in September. There is no inter-bank lending market at present in the U.S. or even globally for that matter. They have shut down. The FED and other central banks have become, in effect, the only banks willing to lend to other banks. Even money markets are contracting. Money market funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds are all in the process of contracting and reducing lending.

The credit crunch is the transmission mechanism by which the current financial crisis translates into a recession. It is the linking event. Financial crisis and recession are therefore but two sides of the same coin, driven by the same set of fundamental causes. The debt-deflation drives the bank, consumer and corporate losses, which results in the credit crunch. Without available funds to borrow, or even borrowing at extremely high rates, businesses in turn begin to cut back, announce mass layoffs, and then shut down or go bankrupt.

The extreme levels of accumulated debt since 2000 has produced a financial crisis correspondingly severe and unlike anything since 1929-34.. The severe and protracted financial collapse has created a credit crunch of equal historic dimensions as well. So there is no reason to assume the recession now emerging will be anything less historic or severe. The current financial crisis and credit contraction is producing a recession of equally deep scope and magnitude—i.e. ‘Epic Recession’—as I have called it last June in an earlier article in this publication. An Epic Recession of particularly long and/or deep duration that shares characteristics of a typical postwar recession but also characteristics of a classic Depression similar to 1929-34, 1873-78, or 1892-97. A recession that is fluid and unstable, and can easily accelerate in the direction of a bona fide Depression.

What Bush has therefore bequeathed the country is an economic crisis of historic proportions—in terms of debt, systemic financial collapse, and Epic recession. In so doing, Bush has turned the clock back on the American economy more than a century.

Fourth Economic Legacy: Record Budget Deficits and Fiscal Crisis of the State

With bailouts, with expected losses in tax revenues in 2009 due to the now deepening recession, and with the certain need for further fiscal stimulus by the federal Government to save State and Local governments from bankruptcy and provide unemployment insurance for the millions more jobless to come—the next U.S. budget deficit will easily double from its current projected level of around $500 billion. (Yes, that’s another $1 trillion!) A mind-boggling $trillion dollar budget deficit that will all but ensure that, whoever wins the November 2008 election, few if any of their campaign promises or programs will see implementation. Instead, a national economic ‘austerity program’ will likely be the agenda come January 2009 regardless who wins. Come January 2009, critical programs like national health care reform, student loans, sustainable environment, jobs creation and protection, foreclosure mortgage relief, retirement systems reform, etc. will all be sidelined more or less permanently, or at best proposed by the new President in only token form with insufficient funding.

The fiscal-budget crisis of the US government that now looms large on the horizon also has potentially enormous consequences for the non-financial economy. The massive budget deficit is the consequence thus far of three primary causes: the $3 trillion Mideast Wars, the $5 trillion tax cuts for corporations and the rich, and now more recently the multi-trillion, still rising bailouts of finance capital at taxpayer expense. A fourth and fifth cause will balloon the budget deficit further. The fourth is the deepening recession itself, which will result in a major shortfall of tax revenues to the federal government. The fifth is need for the federal government to spend significantly more in order to stimulate recovery from the downturn.

Very little to date has been expended by government to help consumers and homeowners and thus stimulate demand to generate any recovery from recession. The depth of the fiscal-budget crisis may thus neutralize to a large extent the ability of the government to engineer a recovery from the recession. Monetary policies of low interest rates have clearly failed to have any effect on recovery, and the FED has little further leeway to lower interest rates in any event. Traditional monetary policy has clearly failed. The full burden of recovery is thus now shifted to Congress, the President, and fiscal policy. But can the government—having wasted so much on Wars, tax cuts for the rich, and bailouts—still afford to stimulate the economy given the pending trillion dollar deficits? That kind of fiscal spending constraint did not exist in 1929-33, whereas it now clearly does.

As the fiscal crisis deepens, it may have no recourse but to pull out of the wars it can no longer afford, find some way to raise taxes on corporations and wealthy investors, and slow the free flow of bailout money to the banks. However, it is highly problematic that Congress and the new President will have the political will to do any of the above.

Trillion dollar budget deficits may also have serious consequences for the U.S. economy in a global sense. It means the US government will have to borrow much of that trillion deficit from foreign sources—central banks, banks, wealth funds, and foreign investors. If it cannot borrow, it will have to print the money. But will foreign sources want to loan that amount to the US? Perhaps not, if they believe the value of their loans might decline overnight. But if they do not, it may mean a collapse of the U.S. dollar as a world currency. And that will in turn hasten the decline of the U.S. dollar still further, in a vicious downward cycle. If the U.S. government cannot borrow enough to cover the trillion deficit, it will have no recourse but to turn to printing money. That will lead to an explosion of inflation, a further decline of the dollar, and even less willingness by foreign sources to loan to the U.S., and so on. In short, the fiscal crisis legacy of Bush carries the very real risk of spawning a consequent U.S. currency crisis of epic dimensions as well.

Fifth Economic Legacy: Chronic Job Loss and Jobless Recessions

More than 3 million US workers have lost jobs to China alone during the two Bush terms, and another million have been lost due to free trade with Mexico, Central America and Canada. Bush’s first recession in 2001 resulted in loss of millions more jobs. It took 48 months, four years, just to return to employment levels that existed in January 2001 on the eve of Bush’s first recession. It was the longest ‘jobless recession’ on record in the post world war II period. We are now in the third Bush jobs recession. The first occurred between 2001-2002. A brief and weak recovery of jobs followed in 2003, followed in turn by another jobs decline in 2003-04. It was not until just before the 2004 elections that job levels fully recovered. By late 2007, after just a brief few years of jobs growth the economy once again began to gush jobs at an alarming rate. After three jobs recessions under Bush, it now appears jobs recessions are becoming endemic to the US economy.

The most recent jobs recession began in 2007 and now has begun to accelerate once again. Officially, more than 750,000 jobs were lost through September in 2008. The actual number is much higher, however, given the conservative way the US government calculates unemployment. For example, in September the government estimated 159,000 jobs were lost. But 337,000 part time workers were hired that month. That means many tends of thousands of US workers were cut back from full time and rehired as part time. Part time work should represent a ‘half’ of job loss, but the government counts part time and fully employed. Since January 2008 at least another 750,000 part time workers were hired. The true job loss since the start of 2008 is thus closer to 1.5 million than the estimated official 800,000 or so.

The Bush jobs legacy has thus been one of shifting more jobs offshore as a result of free trade policies, weak and brief job creation during recoveries from recessions, at least three ‘jobs recessions’ during his watch, and the replacement of millions of higher quality full time jobs with lower paid, lower benefits (or no benefits) part time and temporary jobs. It is an abysmal legacy that explains a good deal why 91 million middle-working class households’ pay and incomes have stagnated or declined.

Sixth Economic Legacy: Middle-Working Class Earnings and Income Stagnation

The real weekly earnings of the 91 million households in the U.S. earning—i.e. 80% of all households earning roughly $80,000 a year or less—are less today than when Bush took office. To maintain standards of living these households—those that constitute the middle and working class—have out of necessity turned to credit cards, refinancing their mortgages when it was possible, and working second and third part time jobs. The chronic loss of jobs due to free trade and repeated jobless recessions, the shift to lower paying service jobs, and companies transferring workers from full time permanent employment to more part time-temporary jobs explains a good deal of the stagnant or declining incomes. But not all. The decline of unions and effectiveness of collective bargaining during Bush’s term has also contributed to the income stagnation, as has the shifting of the cost of rising health insurance, deductibles, and copayments from employers to workers during Bush’s term.

In stark contrast to the Bush legacy of stagnating and declining earnings for the 91 million as a group, the Bush legacy has meant turning a blind eye to multi-million dollar, and even billion dollar, CEO pay packages—including those granted bank executives who received multi-million dollar payoffs even when their companies crash and burn. No wonder the general public were incensed this past September with Treasury Secretary, Paulson’s, proposal for $700 billion TARP bailout! That bailout failed—and continues to fail—to provide any effective constraints on Executive Pay or CEO ‘golden parachutes’. The obscene, uninterrupted, and historically unprecedented explosion of executive pay is thus one of the more visible hallmarks of the Bush economic legacy.

Seventh Economic Legacy: Regulatory Chaos and Endemic Corporate Corruption

Some argue the current financial crisis is the product of financial industry deregulation. But that is only partly correct. Deregulation is only an ‘enabler’ of the crisis, not a fundamental cause of it. Deregulation has allowed the banks to set up ‘shadow’ institutions, as noted above, in which to hide and bury their ‘junk’ securities. It has spurred the process called ‘securitization’, in which bad loans were bundled with other bad or good securities, cut up into 5 to 15 pieces, marked up in price to make a superprofit, and sold and resold around the world to other central banks, banks, funds and private investors. Deregulation allowed banks to work with mortgage lenders to generate record quantities of bad mortgages; allowed banks to spread contagion in the name of spreading risk; permitted excess leveraging by financial and non-financial corporation alike. But deregulation means nothing if debt is not readily available to borrow at excessively low costs. That’s where the FED’s quarter century long loose monetary policy and below normal market interest rates played a complimentary role. Speculation results in excessive leveraging of ‘bad debt’. But leveraging requires easy, low cost borrowing. Deregulation allows leveraging to happen. But super low interest rates by the FED makes it possible in the first place. The two go hand in hand.

The repeal of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and its replacement with the Gramm-Bliley Act removed a major impediment, while providing a major impetus, to financial speculation and excess. But Bush took the opportunity several steps further. Bush’s contribution was to encourage and promote excessive financial speculation; turn over what remained of policing of the banking industry, in particular the investment banks, to the banks themselves; and send the remaining regulatory agency, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), to the sidelines. This policy thrust went on from the very beginning of his term in 2001 up to the outbreak of the financial crisis in late 2007. It is possible to cite numerous and repeated attempts by state and even federal mid-level officials who warned of the dangers of growing financial speculation, in general and with regard to subprimes in particular, from 2002 on. Regulators at both the state and federal levels repeatedly warned from late 2003 on what was going on in the mortgage markets in particular. So it is simply not true that Bush Administration regulators “did not see what was coming”.

In April 2004 the floodgates were further opened. At that time the SEC decided to allow the ‘big 5’ investment banks—i.e. the Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs—to take on unlimited debt and ‘leverage’ as they began their manipulation of the emerging boom in the subprime market. They were no longer required to keep virtually any reserves on hand for emergency situations. They could borrow without limit from the FED, hedge funds, and other private funds and leverage to the hilt, which they did. Bear Stearns, Lehman and the rest typically took on any and all bad debt and leveraged themselves to more than 30 times their available reserves. Moreover, they would be allowed to self-regulate themselves with no further SEC policing or oversight. Without this strong encouragement by the Administration, the excessive bad debt accumulation associated with the subprime market would not have been possible.

Thus the Securities and Exchange Commission did not simply ‘look the other way’. The agency responsible for regulation actively participated in and enabled the deregulation. It helped dismantle the last vestiges of regulation under Bush. Its chief Commissioner, Christopher Cox, was handpicked by Bush because he, Cox, had a long track record as a representative in the House raising and promoting legislation to protect the investment banking industry from lawsuits, loosening accounting rules for executive stock options, and cutting staffing and inspections at the SEC. Bush awarded him with the position.

It is also often forgotten that Secretary of Treasury, Paulson, the administration’s point man for financial system re-regulation, assumed his current role as Treasury Secretary in mid-2006, barely two years ago, and immediately launched as his first act in office a major effort to deregulate the banking industry still further. As the subprime crisis began to emerge in late 2006, Paulson was proposing and championing legislation for looser oversight by the SEC of banks and mortgage companies responsible for the subprime bust. His ‘mantra’ was to replace defined rules governing banks’ practices and behavior with vague, undefined ‘principles’. He originated a special commission to report proposals to do just that, which it did. As part of the report, while controls were further lifted on banks, more controls and restrictions were implemented, in contrast, on regulators. The target of the report were attorney generals and governors, like Eliot Spitzer, who were beginning to act and intervene because the SEC was content to do nothing and ignore the growing crescendo of warnings about the pending subprime crisis.

The same Paulson, ex-CEO of the investment bank, Goldman Sachs, and champion of deregulation under Bush from 2006 on, is now entrusted with financial re-regulation. It should therefore have been no surprise that his original ‘TARP’ proposal called for no new regulatory controls on the banks or limits on executive pay, as he simultaneously proposed to give Banks a handout of $700 billion.

Deregulation is directly related to corporate fraud. In Bush’s first term, scores of CEOs and senior managers were indicted and convicted for various forms of fraud. These companies were mostly associated with the technology sector, in the wake of the dot.com boom and bust. The current financial crisis has yet to produce its own crop of corrupt captains of industry. But it will. Investigations are already well underway by the FBI, SEC, and Congress. The new corruption cases will make the post-dot.com bust fraud revelations pale in comparison in terms of the dollar value rip-offs. Bush will therefore leave office with one of the worst legacies of corporate corruption on his watch.

It is important to note that Bush’s legacy on deregulation and its huge costs to the economy and US taxpayer was not limited to the finance industry. Space does not permit a chronicling of the devastating consequences of other industries’ deregulation under Bush: transport, communications, cross-industry occupational safety and health, environmental, federal labor and wage standards, food and drug safety, and countless other areas. In all cases, however, the result has been greater profits for corporations at the expense of consumers, workers and taxpayers.

Eighth Economic Legacy: The Destruction of Retirement

Another Bush legacy has been the destruction of the retirement system established in the immediate post-World War II period. That system was based upon the idea of a ‘three legged stool’ structure that included Social Security, employer-provided pensions, and personal savings. All three were actively undermined by Bush and have resulted in a crisis of historic proportions, for the more than 44 million retirees today and the 77 million baby boomers who will start joining their ranks starting next year.

The crisis in Social Security is not as described by the Bush administration a few years ago, as Bush desperately attempted to privatize the system. The crisis is the more than $2.3 trillion dollars that has been siphoned out of the Social Security Trust Fund the last two decades, transferred to the U.S. general budget, and spent in order to pay for wealthy and corporate tax cuts, chronic wars under Bush, and ballooning defense budgets. Social Security payroll tax collections for two decades have actually subsidized the U.S. budget, not undermined it. Every year the Social Security program produces a surplus, at the rate of sometimes hundreds of billions of dollars a year. And that surplus is diverted in full and spent. Defenders of the historic theft say ‘we owe it to ourselves’ and can put it all back in the trust fund whenever we need’. True. But to replace it requires the US Government borrowing back the $2.3 trillion from banks and other private sources, paying interest on that debt, and thus adding at least $200 billion more a year for ten years to the coming $1 trillion a year budget deficit. In accounting terms it is possible; in economic and political terms it is not. Bush has borrowed over his eight years in office more than $1.3 trillion of the $2.3 trillion Social Security Trust Fund surplus.

The second ‘leg of the stool’, private pensions, have fared even worse under Bush. When Bush took office there were more than 35,000 defined benefit pension plans, single and multi-employer, in the U.S. Today there are barely 30,000. More than 5,000 have disappeared. That decline has been with the active encouragement of the Bush administration. Throughout his first term and well into his second, Bush allowed underfunded pension plans to defer payments, required by law, into their pension funds to ensure they were solvent. He called these ‘contribution holidays’. In 2004-05 the practice was particularly abusive, in the run-up to the passage of what he called the ‘Pension Protection Guarantee Act of 2006’. That 2006 Act, however, was not designed to rescue defined benefit plans but to hasten their further demise—as witnessed by the collapse of 5000 more plans during his term. His legacy in this area is yet to worsen, moreover. Key elements of that Act permitted pension funds to invest in risky Hedge Funds. The latter are about to go bust in large numbers, resulting in a further crisis of traditional defined benefit pensions and their funds.

Bush consistently pushed the dismantling of defined pensions and their replacement with 401K plans. In fact, the 2006 Act has allowed companies to force-enroll employees in 401Ks. But 401Ks are virtually unregulated and studies show they yield far less in returns available for retirement than do traditional pensions. In fact, the average balance in 401ks today is barely $18,000. That means tens of millions face the future of retirement in the 21st century with only $18K of retirement sources, apart from social security benefits.

The final ‘leg’ of the retirement system stool has been broken as well under Bush. That was supposed to be the accumulation of one third of necessary retirement resources from personal savings. However, under Bush the personal savings rate has collapsed. Americans now have a negative savings rate, as they’ve struggled to barely keep up with the cost of living. Falling annual earnings do not produce savings. In an ominous recent trend, moreover, it appears many are having to borrow from their already insufficient 401ks just to cover medical cost and other expenses.

Bush’s legacy in the area of retirement is a crisis of historic dimensions in insufficient resources for tens of millions.

Ninth Economic Legacy: Dismantling the Postwar Health Care System

Bush has been even more successful in privatizing, and thus dismantling, the post-war health care financing system. By allowing health care insurance premiums and other costs to double during his term, rising more than 10% every year in his first seven years, he has forced employers and workers alike to give up health care coverage altogether or to reduce that coverage in order to afford rising premiums and other costs. There are now more than 47 million Americans without any kind of health coverage whatsoever, an increase of 9 millions since 2000. Eight out of ten of those uninsured are working Americans. More than 1.3 working Americans lost their health insurance coverage in 2006 alone. Approximately 12% of all kids in the U.S. have no health coverage. Despite this collapsing coverage, the U.S. spends nearly twice as much, about 17%, of its total GDP on health care. That compares with 9%-10% for those countries with single payer health delivery systems in Europe, Canada and elsewhere. It means the U.S. spends more than $1 trillion a year on middle men, i.e. mostly insurance companies, to push paper and forms around while delivering not a single health service.

For those still with health insurance, the rising cost burden has also shifted significantly from employers to their workers—by as much as 30% according to some studies—to cover rising costs of not only monthly premiums but out of pocket deductibles and copayments. Thousands of companies have been allowed to abandon their health plans altogether, most notably in recent years the big auto companies which are in the process of dumping their health care funds, underfunded by $50 billion, onto the auto workers’ unions. Employers that once provided medical benefits for their retirees under their plans, benefits often negotiated with their unions, have simply arbitrarily and unilaterally discontinued those benefits. The administration and the courts have encouraged and endorsed such employer and court decisions.

Bush’s long run plan has always been to fully privatize health care, just as it has been to complete the privatization of defined benefit pensions and has attempted to privatize social security. Bush’s creation of so-called Health Savings Accounts, or HSAs, has been the center of the administration’s health care insurance strategy. HSAs are simply the analog of 401ks. Like the latter, they are designed to eliminate and replace group plans provided by employers or negotiated by unions. Bush and employers have as their goal the elimination of any central role by employers providing either retirement or health care coverage. That is what Bush has called his ‘Consumer Driven Society’. That too is his legacy—a health care delivery and financing system that is now as broken as the retirement system.

Tenth Economic Legacy: Massive Tax and Income Shift to the Wealthy

Every year for the first five years of his terms in office Bush pushed historic tax cuts totaling more than $5 trillion. Estimations from sources like Brookings, Urban Institute, and others are that about 73% of the cuts benefited the wealthiest 20% households. 30%, or $1.5 trillion, of that 73% benefited the wealthiest 1% households, or roughly 1.1 million out of the total 114 million taxpaying households in the U.S. But these figures don’t even include tax cuts for corporations, which have amounted to trillions more under Bush. Nor do they include similar massive tax shifting at the State and Local government levels. Where has all that tax cut money gone, one might ask? A good deal of it into Hedge Funds, Private Equity Funds, and other forms of private, unregulated banking—and thus stoking the fires of speculative investment in recent years in subprimes, derivatives and other unregulated financial securities. Other amounts have no doubt contributed to the explosion of offshore tax shelters. According to the investment bank, Morgan Stanley, in 2005 offshore tax shelters had increased their funds from only $250 billion in 1983 to more than $5 trillion by 2004. More recent estimations by the Tax Justice Network indicate tax shelters now hold more than $11 trillion. A reasonable estimate is that wealthy Americans likely account for at least 40% of that total, or around $4-$4.5 trillion. Exactly how much is not currently knowable, since there are around 27 offshore tax shelters, according to the IRS, in mostly sovereign nations like the Cayman Islands, the Seyschells, Isle of Man, Vanuatu and the like which have closed their tax doors and do not cooperate with IRS attempts to investigate how much wealthy US taxpayers have stuffed away in their electronic vaults.

The massive tax shift has been a prime cause of the Bush legacy of shifting relative income and wealth in the U.S. during his term—from roughly 91 million middle and working class taxpaying households to the wealthiest 1% (1.1 million) of U.S. households. There are of course numerous additional means by which income has been shifted from the bottom 80% to the wealthiest 1% (e.g. executive pay), but the tax system restructuring under Bush has likely been the most contributive sources.

An idea of how much this has all resulted in the explosion of income and wealth gains at the top at the expense of those at the bottom 80% has been estimated in recent academic studies by professors Emmanual Saez and Thomas Picketty. Based on their deep analysis of IRS taxes paid over the history of the Federal Income Tax since 1917, the wealthiest 1% of households in the U.S. received about 8.3% of total income in the U.S. in 1978. By 2006, however, that wealthiest 1% were receiving 20.3% of total income generated in the U.S. And that still does not include tax sheltered income. Nor does it include corporations’ retained income or profits diverted offshore to avoid taxes. But the 20.3% does represent a return to almost exactly what the top 1% received in 1928—i.e. 21.09%–on the eve of the last Great Depression!

For the Bush years, that 20.3% translates into incomes of the top 1% growing in real terms at a rate of 11% per year between 2002-2006. In contrast, the remaining 99% of taxpaying households in the U.S. grew in real terms at an annual rate of only 0.9%. It also means that top1% captured about 75% of all the incremental net income gains during the years 2002-06 under Bush. (1)

Two Final Comments

Bush’s ‘Toxic Economic Legacies’ have their roots in policies that are not uniquely his own. The above ten points represent policies that commenced in earnest in the 1980s under Reagan, and in some instances even before that during the last two years of the Jimmy Carter administration. The policies were continued in various form through the administrations of George Bush senior and Bill Clinton with different emphases. What characterizes the administration of George W. Bush is that the toxic legacies were carried to the extreme, accelerated in terms of their effects, as well as their inevitable negative consequences. Whether income shift, financial deregulation and crisis, tax shift, budget deficits and fiscal crisis, the destruction of the retirement and health care systems, etc., Bush represents the continuation of the policies and legacies on an accelerated rate, on a magnified scale—i.e. ‘a toxicity writ large’.

A second, final comment is that these toxic economic legacies are interdependent, one feeding upon and exacerbating the other. It is not possible, for one example, to understand the current financial crisis and emerging global epic recession apart from the massive shift and concentration of income in the hands of the wealthiest household-speculators and corporate-speculators. That is not the sole explanation of the present systemic financial collapse or growing threat of global depression increasing now almost daily. But the financial and economic crisis underway at present cannot be fully comprehended apart from the former either. Reversing the legacies, removing the toxic effects on the future of American economy and society cannot take place without correcting the fundamental causes. And that includes reversing once again, as in the 1930s and 1940s, the perverse and distorted income and wealth distribution afflicting society itself.

Dr. Jack Rasmus

For my update on the most recent US GDP and April Jobs reports, and what the real numbers behind the reports, and trends, indicate, listen to my Wednesday, May 8, Alternative Visions radio show on the progressive radio network online, at PRN.FM. Why the real GDP growth numbers are closer to 1% per quarter and the long term average for jobs in the US is no more than 150,000 and paying lower and lower wages.

IN PART 1 TO ‘DEBATING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS’, I EXPLAINED WHY NEITHER MAINSTREAM ECONOMISTS NOR TRADITIONAL MARXIST ECONOMISTS ARE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THE CAUSES AND EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL CRISIS. IN PART 2 THAT FOLLOWS, AS PROMISED IN PART 1, I STATE BRIEFLY IN 20 BASIC PROPOSITIONS MY OWN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO EXPLAINING THE CRISIS THAT ACCOUNTS FOR FINANCE CAPITAL IN WAYS NEITHER MAINSTREAM NOR MARXIST ECONOMISTS DO.

The following 2nd contribution to the debate summarizes in brief my perspective—neither Mainstream nor contemporary Marxist—on the causes and consequences of the crisis in general, and specifically how financial cycles and real cycles interact to create a crisis that is not a normal recession and not yet a bona fide depression—or what I have called an ‘Epic Recession’. The latter cannot be resolved, I argue, by traditional fiscal-monetary policies, and so long as it remains unresolved the potential increases for it transforming into a bona fide global depression. My perspective is presented in the form of 20 propositions, which I apologize for beforehand as, due to the requirements of debate, are necessarily too brief and general.

Proposition 1:

Deep capitalist cycle contractions (depressions and epic recessions) are driven by endogenous forces, both real and financial, that mutually determine each other, with different relative magnitudes and directions of causality that vary with the phase of the long run boom-bust cycle.

Proposition 2:

The key endogenous Independent variable is not profits but Investment—the latter comprised of two fundamental components: real asset investment (Ig) and financial asset investment (If).

Proposition 3:

Over the boom phase of the cycle, the composition and relative weight of total investment shifts from Ig to If. In the early boom phase, financial assets are created as a one-to-one representation of the market value of real assets. A mortgage is equivalent to the original market value of a new structure, for example. But as the boom phase of the cycle progresses, If expansion becomes increasingly independent of Ig—driven by excess money liquidity, proliferating forms of credit decoupled from money, increasingly leveraged debt financing, and the increasing demand driven character of financial asset price inflation over the boom phase of the cycle.

Proposition 4:

Money may serve as credit; but credit is not limited to the money form. Credit is simultaneously money and more than money. Money may function as ‘outside credit’, but credit is also created ‘inside’ and autonomous of money. Money and autonomous credit are key to understanding the relative shift from Ig to If over the boom phase of the cycle.

Proposition 5:

The relative and absolute shift from Ig to If over the boom phase of the cycle creates destabilizing asset price bubbles and financial crashes that in turn produce deeper and more durable contractions of the real economy than typically occurs in the case of ‘normal’ recessions that are not precipitated by, or associated with, financial instability events. Depressions and epic recessions are not normal recessions ‘writ large’, but reflect the outcome of unique qualitative forces associated with financial cycle volatility.

Proposition 6:

An explosion of both money credit and autonomous credit has been occurring since 1945—the process accelerating with the collapse of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System after 1973; with the global ending of international capital flow controls in the 1980s; with the digitization of financial transfers in the 1990s; and with the global expansion of shadow banking institutions, very high net worth professional investors, highly liquid secondary financial markets, and the proliferation of multiple new forms of financial asset instruments.

Proposition 7:

Decades of excessive liquidity and autonomous credit creation has resulted in a shift to greater debt and growing debt-leveraged financing, which accelerates If forms of investment more than Ig, and short term speculative financial forms of If in particular. Rising debt leveraged financing results in more frequent, larger, and more globalized asset price bubbles and corresponding financial instability.

Proposition 8:

There is no such thing as ‘the’ capitalist price system. There are several price systems. They do not behave alike. The system of financial asset prices is more volatile, in terms of both inflation and deflation, than product or factor (e.g. wage) input prices. Unlike the latter, financial asset prices are driven increasingly by speculative demand over the course of the boom phase of the cycle, and late boom phase in particular. Financial asset prices are subject to little or no supply force constraints during the boom phase, unlike product or factor prices. As financial asset inflation occurs, demand drives prices higher, invoking still more demand, until further price increases are unsustainable and the asset price bubble collapses. Asset price deflation following the financial bust in turn drives product and factor (wage) deflation. All three price systems mutually determine each other in a negatively reinforcing way during the initial stage of the bust phase of the cycle. Asset and product price deflation together dampen Ig, leading to employment declines, wage deflation, and falling household income and consumption. Business and household defaults follow, in turning provoking more asset, product, and factor price deflation that result in rising real debt levels. A generalized downward spiral of debt-deflation-default sets in, resulting in a deeper and more durable contraction of the real economy. The capitalist price mechanism thus plays a central role in destabilizing the system—both in the boom and bust phase—contrary to prevailing mainstream economic ideology that the price system works to restore equilibrium and stability.

Proposition 9:

The forces driving financial asset investment, If, slow real asset investment, Ig, during the late boom phase by diverting financing from Ig to If, and thereafter subsequently accelerating the already declining Ig during the initial bust phase. The growing frequency, magnitude, scope, and duration of financial investment, bubbles, and crashes over the long run thus have a combined negative impact on Ig—i. e. more slowly during the boom phase (a structural effect) and more rapidly during the bust phase (a cyclical effect). This long run decline of Ig relative to If due to both structural and cyclical causes convinces successful real asset investment companies to shift more toward If forms of investment. Thus, a company like General Electric, for example, perhaps the largest manufacturer in the world, increasingly shifts to and relies upon portfolio (e.g. financial asset) investing over the longer term.

Proposition 10:

This overall ‘Financial Shift Effect’ further results in non-financial capitalist enterprises seeking to reduce labor and other factor input costs over the longer term by various measures—i.e. reducing labor costs by moving to offshore markets, demanding further tax concessions and subsidies from the state, reducing inter-capitalist competition costs (free trade), shifting operating cost burden to workers and consumers (industry deregulation), and restructuring labor costs in the home market (de-unionization, more part time-temp labor, cutting social security-medicare and private pension ‘deferred’ wages, shifting medical costs to its workforce, reducing paid time off, delaying minimum wage adjustments, etc.), to name but the most obvious.

Proposition 11:

Income for the ‘bottom 80%’ primarily wage earning households progressively stagnates and declines over the boom phase of the cycle, as operating income for both financial and non-financial corporations in contrast rises. To offset declining real income for the 80%, consumer household credit and debt grow—especially mortgage, student loan, credit card, and installment loan forms. Terms and conditions of debt repayment are typically ‘lenient’ during the boom phase, thus serving to accelerate credit and debt accumulation. Financial institutions are more than willing to extend credit and debt to such households, charging interest that in effect represents a claim on future, not yet paid wages.

Proposition 12

Systemic Fragility grows over the boom phase, accelerating in its later stages, composed initially of both business Financial Fragility and household Consumption Fragility. Fragility is a ratio and a function of three elements: rising indebtedness, declining liquid income, and the terms and conditions for which payment on incurred debt is made. Mainstream economics bifurcates this ratio: the Hybrid Keynesian wing considers income but largely disregards finance, credit and debt as equivalently important variables; the Retro Classicalist wing considers credit and debt but de-emphasizes the role of income. Both minimize the importance of ‘terms and conditions’ of repayment by focusing only on a subset—the interest rate—of this third element determining fragility.

Proposition 13:

Over the boom phase, rising household indebtedness amidst stagnating and declining household income represents rising ‘Consumption Fragility’ (CF) within the system. Similarly over the boom phase, rising financial institution (banks, shadow banks, and portfolio operations of large corporations) indebtedness that occurs with the increasing shift to debt-leveraging financing of If, represents ‘Financial Fragility’ (FF). Financial fragility during the boom phase is obscured by rising financial asset inflation. Consumption fragility is obscured by the continuing growth of consumption driven by debt. Both obscured effects disappear with the onset of the boom phase, revealing the true condition of fragility deterioration during the boom.

Proposition 14:

During the boom phase, a third form of fragility—Government Balance Sheet Fragility (GBSF)—also grows, as successive financial instability events of growing intensity require repeated government bailouts of financial institutions and as fiscal stimulus policies are introduced in successive (normal) recessions to assist recovery of non-financial corporations. In addition to these cyclical contributions to GBSF, structural causes also contribute to GBSF, as legislated tax cuts and subsidies for corporations adds further to government debt and thus GBSF. Thirdly, in the particular case of the United States, the policy choice since the 1980s to run annual and growing trade deficits adds still further to total deficits and debt levels. Dollars accumulate abroad due to the trade deficits and US trading partners agree to recycle the dollars back to the US by purchasing US Treasury bonds. Knowing the bond purchases will continue, the US federal government cuts taxes and increases spending further still, thus raising the deficit and total government debt. Federal debt consequently grows from less than $1 trillion to more than $15 trillion in the process. GBSF rises due to rising debt and falling (tax revenue) income.

Proposition 15:

During the initial bust phase following a financial crash, financial asset prices collapse and financial fragility accelerates, with its consequent effects on real Ig, employment declines, and the debt-deflation-default processes previously noted. Simultaneously, Consumption Fragility—already rising during the boom phase—deteriorates even more rapidly, driven by income declines due to mass layoffs, wage-benefit reductions, shorter hours of work and weekly earnings, and negative wealth effects as savings levels and rates of growth collapse. The financial crash thus precipitates a further ‘fracturing’ of both financial and consumption fragility. By means of the price system and the debt-deflation-default process, Financial and Consumption Fragility thus exacerbate each other in the course of the downturn. Just as the financial side of the economy causes a deterioration of real side conditions, the latter in turn cause a further deterioration of the financial side. The internal transmission mechanism of this mutual feedback is the debt-deflation-default process, which also contains its own inter-causal feedback effects.

Proposition 16:

Rising real debt, deflation across the three price systems, declining cash flow and disposable income, and the corresponding collapse of available credit transmits to the real economy in the form of a rapid decline in business and consumer spending, which in turn feedback upon each other. A faster, deeper and more protracted recession results, not a ‘normal’ recession precipitated by external demand or supply shocks, but an ‘epic’ recession precipitated by a financial crash and accelerated by an endogenous condition of extreme ‘systemic fragility’.

Proposition 17:

As the bust phase of the cycle continues and recession deepens, Government Balance Sheet Fragility—already growing per forces noted in proposition #14 above—rises further as well, as government fiscal-monetary stimulus policies attempt to halt the downturn. However, GBSF is not without limits. Under particularly severe conditions of Financial and Consumption Fragility, attempts to halt the momentum of decline by means of tax cuts and spending may prove insufficient while nonetheless adding to GBSF. The result is an extended period of ‘stop-go’ recovery, with short and brief real economic growth punctuated by repeated relapses, and even double dip recessions. This ‘stop-go’ recovery trajectory may continue for years, and even decades, should Systemic Fragility rise or remain high.

Proposition 18:

Systemic fragility in its three basic forms, and their mutual amplifying feedback effects, transmit to the real economy by means of reductions in fiscal and monetary multiplier effects. In the attempted recovery phase, the State engages in fiscal stimuli to bail out banks, corporations and investors. However, Systemic Fragility means business tax cut multipliers have sharply declined, to less than 1.0. State fiscal stimulus consequently results in business, and especially Multinational Corporations, cash hoarding. Cash hoarded is then diverted to corporate stock buybacks and dividend payouts, diversion of real asset investment to offshore emerging markets, and into new financial asset speculative investing in an effort to resort collapsed asset values and corporate balance sheets. Real investment and thus job creation subsequently lags and a stagnant stop-go recovery results.

Proposition 19:

Systemic fragility and its amplifying effects also serves to reduce money multipliers. Massive money supply injections by central banks are initially hoarded, then redirected to lending offshore, to financial speculation, and to ‘safer’ large corporations. Banks reduce lending to ‘less safe’ smaller businesses and households, further reducing investment, jobs and consumption demand. Money demand and money velocity thus offset money supply injection by central banks. Central bank QE and zero interest policies provoke instead new financial bubbles in stocks, junk bonds, real estate, foreign exchange and derivatives trading. Currency wars erupt as money injection policies depress currency exchange rates. Banks and financial markets become increasingly addicted (dependent upon) central banks money injections. Globally, financial speculation raises the specter of further financial instability on a real economy base further weakened by the preceding cycle of economic contraction. The risk of bona fide global depression rises in time.

Proposition 20:

In the context of conditions noted above—of systemic fragility and growing feedback amplitude effects—traditional fiscal-monetary policy tools attempting to expand the economy are rendered increasingly ‘inelastic’ (i.e. less sensitive or effective) in generating a sustained economic recovery. Conversely, when such tools are employed to contract the economy, via austerity fiscal policies and/or central bank raising of interest rates, the effects are more ‘elastic’ (i.e. more sensitive and effective) in contracting the real economy. Fiscal-monetary policies are therefore not simply increasingly non-productive but, over time, become counter-productive in generating recovery. Solutions to recovery consequently lie in the necessity of a major restructuring of the economy along multiple key sectors including, but not limited to, the tax system, banking system, retirement and healthcare systems, labor markets and public investment—with the purpose of redistributing income while simultaneously reducing debt. That is, reducing systemic fragility in aggregate as well as its mutual amplifying effects.

Jack Rasmus, copyright April 2013

AS AN AUTHOR PUBLISHED BY PLUTO BOOKS, I HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED IN A DEBATE WITH OTHER PLUTO AUTHORS ON THE CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS. THE FOLLOWING IS MY FIRST ENTRY IN THAT DEBATE.

A correct identification and analysis of the causes of the crisis is important. It is essential for proposing effective solutions. Failure to understand true causes leads to proposing ineffective solutions and, in turn, to adopting wrong strategies.

Allow me to begin this debate with a brief overview of mainstream-bourgeois, left-liberal, and contemporary Marxist explanations of the causes of the crisis, and explain why they are in error. Following that, I will offer a brief outline of my own view of the fundamental causes of the crisis, represented by 20 fundamental propositions.

Contending explanations of the global economic crisis that surfaced in 2007-08 reduce to the key question: what is the relationship between the financial and non-financial (real) sectors of the economy in the origination, precipitation, and continuing evolution of the current global economic crisis? Is the crisis essentially a financial event, that subsequently negatively impacted the real economy; or is the financial crisis just the appearance of a more essential development originating in the real side of the economy.

Simple observation shows that Finance Capital has had something fundamental to do with the current crisis. Nevertheless some argue it is not fundamental and that the originating locus of the crisis resides with variables on the real side of the economy—i.e. profits, wages, private real asset investment(structures, equipment, inventories, etc.). But to argue that such real side forces are solely—or even primarily—responsible for the crisis, and that financial forces (global financial institutions, new liquid markets, new securities creation, exploding credit-debt relationships, etc.) and financial instability (number, frequency and magnitude of financial bubbles and crashes) are merely derivative of those real forces, is as incorrect as to argue that financial forces solely explain the current crisis.

More precisely: to argue that a falling rate of profit is responsible for the crisis of 2007-08 is as simplistically incorrect as to argue the mortgage market bust caused the deep collapse of the real economy post-2007, and the subsequent double and triple dip recessions, and bona fide depressions in the Euro periphery, now beginning to appear globally .

There is no simple linear causal relationship from profits to crisis. Profits are not the sole, or even primary, determinant of investment and the current global crisis is fundamentally about investment—both declining real asset investment and escalating financial asset investment. The fundamental driving force behind the crisis are the changing causal relationships between the two forms of Investment—real asset and financial asset—and the mutually reinforcing transmission mechanisms between them. (A more detailed initial treatment of the relationships between real and financial asset investment is available in my 2010 book, ‘Epic Recession: Prelude to Global Depression’, by Pluto).

The task of analysis therefore is to explain the relationship between the financial and the real forces in the crisis, beginning with the two forms of investment. To explain to what extent financial and real forces are autonomous of each other and to what extent they determine each other. Precisely how do those mutual determinations occur; that is, what exactly are the empirical ‘transmission mechanisms’ that represent the feedback effects between financial and real?
It is unfortunate that much of economic analysis today (left, right and mainstream academic) claiming to have identified causes of the crisis is mostly identification of simple correlation relationships assumed to reflect causal relationships. Moreover, the ‘correlations as causation’ are typically one-directional, from real to financial or financial to real. Nor do the unidirectional ‘correlations as causation’ claims both to explain the transmission mechanisms by which the real side variables determine the financial.

For example: One wing of mainstream economists claim the collapse of the real economy is correlated strongly with central banks’ money supply mismanagement; therefore money supply mismanagement caused both the financial crash and the consequent deep contraction of the real economy. This views the capitalist economy as fundamentally stable and that (monetary) policy makers simply screwed it up. Another wing of mainstream economists argue regulatory policy was the cause of the crisis, as financial deregulation provoked the crisis that began 2007-08. Similar ‘single correlations’ analyses abound in mainstream economic analyses of the crisis, mostly associated with ‘this or that’ policy error that appears correlated with the crisis and therefore assumed to be causative. Fundamental systemic forces endogenous to the capitalist system are never considered. Neither real nor financial forces are considered primary determinants of crisis. (For my critique of these views, see ‘Obama’s Economy: Recovery for the Few’, 2012, Pluto Books).

Views on the left correctly reject this view that the system is basically stable and crises are due to policy errors. Left views recognizes endogenous forces are responsible for the crisis. However, endogenous forces are always ‘real’ and ‘financial’ forces always derivative, as in the case of mainstream analysis. Correlations are assumed causative and no transmission mechanisms from the real to the financial are described—let alone mechanisms that represent mutual feedbacks and inter-determinations.

For example, the prevailing left-progressive critique of Neoliberalism identifies the compression and stagnation of wages since the 1980s as responsible for the recovery of corporate profits thereafter. Above historical average excess profits obtained at the direct expense of wages consequently fueled the expansion of profits and in turn the financial excesses that followed that eventually caused financial instability.

Disagreement with the Neoliberal critique view on the timing and direction of profits and wage change, but still agreeing with the idea that real forces are primary and financial forces derivative, a variant of contemporary Marxist analysis argues wage and profit decline actually preceded the 1980s by a decade. By means of various convenient redefinitions of what constitutes profits and adopting a very narrow definition of wages, this view argues real wages have not really stagnated and therefore profits from real asset investment have continued to steadily decline since the 1980s. Thus, profits decline on the real side of the economy, not profit expansion, is behind financialization and financial profits as Capitalists have offset the tendency toward real profits decline by turning to financial profits. (For my more detailed critique of this view, readers are referred to the forthcoming article, “The Bifurcation of Marxist Economic Analysis”, in the March 2013 issue of the World Review of Political Economy).

In all the preceding explanations, moreover, terms of analysis are left vague and undefined, on both the real and financial side. On the left, problems of profit definition, global profits data access, and profits under-reporting are ignored. Wages are narrowly defined, excluding various categories of labor and pay. For the mainstream view, explanation occurs in the ‘conceptual ether’ above all reference even to profits, wages, or any other real variables. Money supply mismanagement thus occurs in a theoretical ‘black box’.

Linear correlations passed off as causation, high level generalizations without explanation of ‘transmission mechanisms’ and feedback effects, vague definitions of key terms, reference to insufficient data—all these fundamental errors of analysis characterize bourgeois, left-liberal, and even some contemporary Marxist analyses of the current crisis. The crisis is not viewed as the result of mutually determining real and financial forces. The fundamental variable of investment in its two key elements—real asset and financial asset—and their shifting causal interrelationships are not considered primary. The role of the capitalist price system as a major system destabilizer is not considered in any of the above approaches to ‘real side only’ analysis.

In my follow-up second contribution to this debate, I will review 20 ‘fundamental propositions’ that summarize my alternative perspective on the causes and consequences of the crisis—a perspective that integrates real and financial variables, the price system, and the new realities of 21st century Finance Capital to produce what will be referred to as a growing ‘systemic fragility’ in the global Capitalist System today. A perspective that explains why no sustained recovery has occurred after five years of crisis, why double and triple dip recessions are now appearing globally, and why the current ‘Epic’ recession is drifting toward a bona fide depression.

Jack Rasmus
March 2, 2013

comment: THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN TWO DAYS PRIOR TO PRESIDENT OBAMA’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS 2014 BUDGET, AND PREDICTED MOSTLY WHAT HE PROPOSED RE. CUTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY-MEDICARE AND RESTORATION OF CUTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING. THE ARTICLE SUMMARIZES THE HISTORY OF DEFICIT CUTTING FROM OBAMA’S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF A ‘GRAND BARGAIN’ IN SUMMER 2011 TO HIS CURRENT ‘COLLUSION’ WITH HOUSE REPUBLICATIONS TO CUT SOCIAL SECURITY AND RESTORE SEQUESTERED DEFENSE SPENDING CUTS.

ON APRIL 10, PRESIDENT Obama released his formal budget for Fiscal 2014 beginning this October. Liberals should not act shocked and surprised: Obama’s repeated offers to cut Social Security cost-of-living adjustments, and other yet undefined Medicare measures, are a continuation of his practice and approach for the past two years.

The budget will usher in the final stage of negotiations over the proposed deficit cuts — Austerity American Style — that began with the recommendations of Obama’s Deficit Cutting Commission, referred to as the Simpson-Bowles report, that was made public in November 2010.

The Simpson-Bowles Commission — chaired by arch-conservative retired Senator Alan Simpson, and Bill Clinton’s chief of staff, now investment banker Erskine Bowles — proposed an approximate $4 trillion cut in U.S. deficits and debt for the subsequent decade. Their report has been the ‘template’ for deficit cutting negotiations ever since.

Issued around the time the Teapublicans took over the U.S. House of Representatives in late 2010, the report was offered by the Obama administration as the basis for negotiating a “grand bargain” of $4 trillion in deficit cuts in summer of 2011. The $4 trillion target was agreed by virtually all parties in Congress and the administration at that time — and ever since. The only difference was, and remains, “the mix:” how much in spending cuts vs. how much tax revenue hikes; how much to cut defense spending vs. how much social programs; and how much to tax the wealthiest 2% vs. the middle class.

In June 2011, Vice-President Biden was assigned by Obama to begin negotiating the basis for the “grand bargain.” He and House Speaker John Boehner attempted and failed to do so, even though Biden had offered a package of 87% spending cuts to only 13% tax hikes — even more onerous than Simpson-Bowles’ recommended 75%-25% mix.

Obama then took over negotiations with Boehner directly in July 2011. He unilaterally — i.e. with no counter concession from Boehner — offered to cut Social Security and Medicare by $700 billion to entice Boehner and House Teapublicans into a deal. Offering big cuts in Social Security-Medicare has thus been a bargaining tactic by Obama, the “carrot” dangled to the Teapublicans to entice them to agree to a $4 trillion Grand Bargain from the very beginning.

Boehner and the Teapublicans did not bite on Obama’s grand bargain offer in July 2011, however. They held firm and demanded an “all spending cuts” agreement in exchange for raising the federal government the debt ceiling in August 2011. They got their way. Obama and the Democrats caved in on all his demands by August for some tax revenue hikes. All they got from the August 2011 debt ceiling deal was agreement from the Teapublicans not to raise the debt ceiling issue again until after the November 2012 elections. Very convenient for the president and the Democrats; not so for the rest of us since the August deal involved $1 trillion in immediate social spending only cuts, mostly in public education, with another $1.2 trillion in spending only cuts — the “sequester cuts” — that would take effect on January 1, 2013.
As part of that August 2011 $2.2 trillion deal, Congress was given the option to cut even more than the $1.2 trillion ‘sequester’ part of the total. A special committee of Congress (the so- called Supercommittee of House and Senate leaders) was established and given the option to cut more than the $1.2 trillion by year end 2011. The Supercommittee, however, not surprisingly decided to “kick the can down the road,” shelvingf all deficit cutting during the 2012 election year.
Instead, in 2012 both parties and their candidates talked about economic programs neither had any intention of introducing. Regardless of who won the November 2012 election, the Simpson- Bowles “template” was waiting in the desk top drawer, to be resurrected after November 2012. And that’s just what happened: Within days following the election, Obama immediately offered $340 billion in “entitlement” program cuts in his attempt once again to resurrect the grand bargain negotiations.

Phony Fiscal Cliff: It’s the Tax Cuts, Stupid!

But the Teapublicans and big corporate interests, in the form of the Business Roundtable in particular — the biggest and most influence U.S. corporate lobbying group, composed of CEOs of the largest corporations — were neither interested in a “grand bargain” at that time. The Business Roundtable preferred to focus initially only on the Bush tax cuts that were also scheduled to expire January 1 — not the “sequestered” $1.2 trillion in spending cuts also scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2013.

The Bush tax cuts — more than 80% accruing to wealthy households and investors — were far more important to them than the spending cuts. Their primary goal has always been to protect and extend the Bush tax cuts; cutting spending and deficits has always been secondary, and the cuts should be at the expense of social programs.

The Bush tax cuts amounted to $4.6 trillion for the coming decade, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The CBO’s projected deficits for the coming decade, should the Bush tax cuts be totally repealed, amounted to only $2.5 trillion. Extending the tax cuts meant the projected deficit would amount to around $7 trillion. To borrow the popular phrase: It’s not about deficits; it’s the Bush tax cuts, stupid!

Following last November 2012’s elections, the Teapublicans initially wanted all the Bush cuts extended permanently, but the Business Roundtable wanted some kind of a settlement on the tax issue first. Without that happening, the Roundtable’s even bigger objective of a major revision of the entire tax code, including cuts in the top rate of corporate taxes from 35% to 26%, already working its way through Congress, could not proceed. To preserve as much of the Bush tax cuts as possible the issue had to be decoupled from the sequester. Furthermore, the Bush tax cuts had to be resolved before the tax code could be revised and corporate tax rates reduced.
Following the November elections, the Roundtable therefore blocked with Obama and against the House Teapublicans. To get the public on board, the media spin given to the Bush tax cuts extension was labeled the “Fiscal Cliff.” Although the media included the sequestered spending cuts as part of the “Fiscal Cliff,” that issue was separated tactically by both the Roundtable and Obama weeks before January 1, 2013.

With the assistance of House Speaker Boehner, Obama plus the Roundtable prevailed over the Teapublicans. It was touch and go, with Teapublican leaders like Ryan and Cantor wavering and striking a neutral pose to protect their ultra-conservative credentials. But no doubt in the end, campaign finance spending by the Roundtable big corporations prevailed and the Obama- Roundtable-Boehner nexus were able to swing a sufficient number of House Republicans to get a “tax deal” on January 1, 2013.

And how sweet a deal it was. Only $60 billion a year of the deficit was reduced, impacting less than 0.7% of the wealthiest households — far fewer than Obama’s promised 2%. Moreover, as part of the deal, the Alternative Minimum Tax was permanently repealed (amounting to about $100 billion a year tax cut benefit to the wealthy), the Inheritance Tax was cut even more generously than under Bush, and all the other Bush tax cuts were made permanent. No need to extend them ever again.

The total cost in revenue loss and therefore deficit increase that remained was $4 trillion over the coming decade. Ironically, that’s just about what the Simpson-Bowles commission recommended in deficit reduction. The deficit for the coming decade was thus raised from $2.5 trillion to now about $7 trillion as result of the Bush tax cut deal — billed as “avoiding the Fiscal Cliff” — of January 1, 2013. Now the attack on spending could begin in earnest once again, and focusing on entitlements in particular.

As part of the January 1 deal, the sequestered additional $1.2 trillion in spending cuts were postponed for two more months, until March 1, 2013. In signing the deal on January 2, Obama declared that more tax revenue hikes would have to be negotiated in future deals. No doubt he and Democrats believed that the March 1 date would put pressure on the Teapublicans to compromise on more tax hikes in exchange for avoiding the approximate $500 billion in defense spending cuts that were part of the sequestered $1.2 trillion going into effect on March 1.

There was also the March 27, 2013 date when the Federal government would run out of money to pay its bills. Surely, the Teapublicans didn’t want to get blamed again for that fiasco, as they had been in the past? And thereafter there was the May 18, 2013 revisiting of the debt ceiling extension. Obama undoubtedly believed that somewhere along this line the Republicans would give him the token tax hikes he needed as cover to agree to his massive cuts in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid he was always willing to make as part of a Grand Bargain.

But the Teapublicans again called his bluff. They let the sequestered spending cuts, including the defense cuts, go into effect on March 1, 2013. They then agreed to fund the government past March 27 and suggested as well the debt ceiling would not be an issue. This left Obama with no bargaining leverage for insisting on tax revenue hikes. His answer has been his increasingly desperate re-offering of big Social Security and Medicare cuts in recent weeks, some of which appear in part in his April 10 budget. That will serve as a base from which he will then agree to even further cuts in subsequent negotiations with Teapublicans in the House (and Roundtable CEOs in the background).

Some Key Strategic Questions

The question is why have the Teapublicans agreed to the token January 1 tax hikes? Why did they agree to allow the $1.2 trillion sequestered cuts, including defense spending, go into effect? Why did they not engage in brinksmanship again on March 1 or March 27, unlike wqhat they did in August 2011? And why will they not go to the brink again on the debt ceiling issue when it arises once more in May?

The answer to the first question is that they got a tax deal they simply couldn’t refuse on January 1, and one which their big corporate campaign benefactors, the Business Roundtable, wanted. After having blocked with Obama prior to the January 1 deal, however, the Roundtable has since shifted gears and adopted in total the Teapublicans’ position on subsequent spending cuts.
In February 2013, the Roundtable came out with its position paper on the matter of sequestered cuts and entitlement spending. It proposed to cut the Social Security COLA (cost of living adjustment), introduce a means test for Medicare, raise the eligibility age for both Medicare AND social security to 70, and convert Medicare into a voucher system in 2022. That’s exactly the Teapublican-Paul Ryan program.

With big corporate interests now in their corner firmly with regard to entitlement cuts as the primary focus of deficit cutting, why should the Teapublicans agree to any further tax hikes on the rich? And with the Roundtable and CEOs now firmly on their side, and the tax cuts successfully decoupled from the spending cuts, why should the Teapublicans go to the brink over shutting down the government on March 27? By March 1 they were already almost three- fourths of the way to the $4 trillion deficit target, with a total of $2.8 trillion in spending cuts and token tax hikes!
By letting the March 1 sequestered cuts take effect, the Teapublicans in effect did to Obama on the topic of defense spending what Obama had the opportunity – but didn‘t take — to do to them on the topic of Bush tax cuts on January 1. Obama could have let all the Bush tax cuts expire January 1, and then reintroduced middle class tax cuts only on January 2. That would have put the Teapublicans in the position of having to vote down middle class tax cuts. But he didn’t, and settled for the paltry 0.7% hike on taxes on the wealthy, some of which will undoubtedly be reversed again, buried deep in the legislation, when the major tax code negotiations conclude later this year.

The Teapublicans, by allowing the sequestered defense cuts to take effect on March 1, can also always reintroduce legislation piecemeal later this year to restore many of the defense cuts.
It’s not surprising that Republican Senator, Lindsey Graham, and others in Congress, in recent weeks have offered “deals” amounting to another $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction. That number is not coincidental, as $1.2 trillion is now the remaining “target” number . Graham’s proposal is for $600 billion in Social Security and Medicare cuts and another $600 billion in unspecified tax revenues.

So why should Teapublicans precipitate a political crisis over the March 1 or March 27 deadlines? Why should they repeat the debt ceiling crisis on May 18? They’re winning hands down.

What Obama May Propose

Having agreed to decouple tax cuts on January 1 and having been outmaneuvered on March 1 and March 27, and with Teapublicans signaling there will be no debt ceiling crisis in May, Obama has been stripped of all his leverage points in bargaining. Obama has left only the option to offer even more Social security, Medicare and Medicaid cuts. And throughout March he continued to do so, once again unilaterally — not just offering again to cut COLA adjustments for Social Security but suggesting his willingness to confront big cuts in the $600-$700 billion range for Medicare and Social Security and more for Medicaid.

But Obama has planned all along to cut Social Security and Medicare. He made that clear in his signing of the Bush tax cuts deal on January 2, 2013, during which he stated: “Medicare is the main cause of deficits.” Again in his February State of the Union address, the president publicly noted he “liked the Simpson-Bowles” recommendations concerning Medicare cuts.

And what are those recommendations? Instituting a new $550 a year deductible for Parts A and B of Medicare, and providing only 80% coverage for Part A instead of the current 100% (which would require another $150-$300 a month in private insurance to cover the remaining 20%, much like Part B now). That together amounts to another $195-$350 taken out of monthly Social Security checks, when the average for social security benefit payments is only $1100 a month today.

In other words, Medicare benefits will not be cut – but if seniors want to maintain current levels of benefits they’ll have to pay even more for them. Alternatively, they can choose to have fewer benefits and not pay more. It’s all about rationing health care, just as Obamacare for those under 65 is essentially about rationing — as were Bush’s proposals to expand health savings accounts (HSAs) and Bill Clinton’s health maintenance organization (HMOs) solution.

With only $1.2 more to cut in deficit spending to reach the Simpson-Bowles $4 trillion target, and Obama offering again his $600-$700 billion enticement in entitlement spending cuts, a deal is closer than ever before. Watch therefore for the full $600 billion in Social security, Medicare and Medicaid to take effect, the effective date of the changes to be backloaded in later years of the decade and certainly not before the 2014 midterm elections.

Expect defense spending cuts of no more than half the $500 billion proposed in the sequester, and nearly all of which will be from withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq operations, not from equipment spending. After 2014, most will be recouped as defense spending on naval and air force equipment and operations will ramp up for the shift of U.S. military focus to the Pacific. They Army brass haqs had its land wars in Asia; now it’s the turn of Navy and Air Force.

That leaves only a “token” tax revenue increase of about $200 billion over the coming decade, or a paltry $20 billion a year, which will come in difficult to estimate phony “loophole” closings. Major cuts in corporate taxes later in 2013 will not be factored into the Grand Bargain $4 trillion official calculations. In addition to big cuts in the top corporate tax rate, look as well for multinational corporations’ tax breaks and tax forgiveness on the $1.4 trillion they are presently sheltering in offshore subsidiaries. Of course, small-to-medium business will be thrown yet another tax cut bone to buy into the deal. In exchange, the middle class will pay more in terms of limits on deductions and exemptions.

Grand Collusion

In retrospect over the past three years, and especially since November 2012, the Grand Bargain looks less like a bargain and more like a “grand collusion” among the various parties — Teapublican, Big Corporate, Obama, and the pro-corporate wing of Democrats in Congress that have had a stranglehold on the Democratic party since the late 1980s.

This is not the Democratic Party of your grandfather that agreed to introduce Social Security in the 1930s and that proposed Medicare in the 1960s. This is the Democratic Party, and the Democratic President, that has agreed with Republicans and Corporate America to begin the repealing in stages of these very same programs — programs that are not “entitlements” but are in fact deferred wages earned by Americans over the decades, are now being “concession bargained” away.

Not content with concessions from those workers still in the labor force, capitalist policymakers are intent on concessions on social wages now coming due in the form of Social Security and Medicare benefits. It’s a charade from Simpson-Bowles to the present.

What should be done? Writing letters to Congress won’t change anything. What is now necessary is to begin the formation nationwide of Social Security-Medicare Defense Clubs. After all, that’s how Social Security started in the first place. Neither party proposed it in the 1930s initially.

In fact, Roosevelt initially publicly advocated that Social Security should not be part of the New Deal. A grassroots protest organized by the clubs forced him and the Democrats to reverse this position just before the midterm 1934 elections and support the proposal for Social Security. Now it’s time to reform the clubs to defend Social Security — and the first action should be to call for a million person march on Washington to reverse whatever cuts are surely ahead.

Jack is the author of Obama’s Economy: Recovery for the Few (2012), which provides a history of deficit cutting in the US and predictions of its impact. His blog is jackrasmus.com. For a video presentation on Social Security and Medicare given recently to the Progressive Democrats of America, see his website at http://kyklosproductions.com/video/130228_PDA-forum_rasmus/.

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