Jack Rasmus

The German economy had been long hailed as the economic ‘engine’ of Europe. If so, it clearly needs a major ‘valve job’ and is running on only 5, or maybe 4, cylinders.

It is in recession that will no doubt deteriorate further. Politically, it is also becoming more unstable as the right wing Afd party, and the newly formed left party led by Susan Wagenacht, are about to register major gains within days in German regional elections now underway.

The ruling SPD Sholtz coalition with Greens–both strong proponents of support of Ukraine with weapons and funding until recently–last week announced it would provide no further funds or weapons for Ukraine. The unpopularity for the SPD support for that war is widespread now, as is public opinion about Sholtz’s handling of what can only be called the de-industrialization of Germany.

Recent German public revelations that German police investigations revealed Ukraine special forces, with NATO assistance, were responsible for blowing up Germany’s Nordstream pipeline in September 2022, and the fact Sholtz’s government has remained silent about the matter–except to complain to Poland as one of the saboteurs of the pipeline’s destruction, a Ukrainian businessmen, successfully fled to Poland which allowed him to make his way back to Ukraine.

German public opinion is also complaining the Sholtz government has also meekly addressed policies of the USA since 2022 responsible for Germany’s continuing economic decline as well. Not just the US direction of the sabotage of the Nordstream pipeline but subsequent economic policies of the USA that have been undermining Germany’s economy as well: in particular the USA’s oil companies’ charging natural gas imports to Germany costing 3X and 4X that formerly charged by Russia; the Biden administration announced tax and trade policies that have been now luring German business investments to the USA that otherwise might have been invested in Germany itself; and US convincing EU supra-elites in the EU Commission to join the US in sanctioning and raising tariffs on China imports to the EU.

The declining condition of Germany’s economy as the ‘economic engine’ of Europe reveals that perhaps the ‘Plan B’ purpose of Biden/US Russia sanctions on Russia has been to make Germany/EU more economically dependent on the USA. Even if those same sanctions haven’t proven successful with regard to ‘Plan A’ which was has been precipitating the economic instability of Russia!

The USA sanctions policy has thus succeeded re. making Europe more dependent on the USA–even if that policy has failed with regard to destabilizing Russia’s economy and the Putin regime.

A recent post by UK economist and political commentator, Michael Roberts, has gathered extensive data with charts revealing the depth and extent of the growing crisis in Germany’s economy and electoral alignments as of today. It is worth referencing and can be found at:

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/FMfcgzQVzPDQzQgKSStzdXXrxBRKKWpr

My only ‘critique’, if it can even be called that, of Roberts’ data and data that show conclusively the serious condition of Germany as the engine of Europe is he perhaps might have discussed more how US economic policies have seriously contributed to the decline in Germany and the growing economic (and political) dependence of it, and Europe itself, on the USA as a result of those US policies.

My contributing comment to Roberts’ otherwise excellent piece is as noted below:

Excellent summary, Mr. Roberts, but I would have liked to have read more analysis how US policies re. Europe, especially sanctions, takeover of energy, tax incentives to invest in USA instead of Germany, etc. are contributing to German recession. Also, the West (G7/8) is in a goods recession everywhere. US manufacturing PMI has been contracting for 8 months, now lowest level, while construction activity is down 1/3 and contracting further this summer. US GDP numbers are misleading. How can it be 3% in 2nd quarter when corresponding Gross Domestic Income, GDI, is only 1.3%? Unemployment is not 4.3% when part time & discouraged workers leaving labor force is counted; it’s 7.8%. Inflation is not 2.6% (PCE) but at least 5% when the questionable assumptions for calculating prices are removed from both PCE and CPI. Even official US stats show a seriously slowing economy: manufacturing PMI, new housing starts, home sales, commercial construction, industrial activity, CPS (small bus. sector) job statistics (not CES), even real retail sales flat, and so on. US and global recession will deepen in 2025, given economic trends that will be exacerbated by USA & EU intensifying political crises and decline of the $US as BRICS challenge accelerates.

The Ukraine War is at a crossroads. It is entering a new phase. Military and political strategies on both sides are in flux. Both Ukraine and Russia have opened new fronts and offensives—Ukraine in the northern Kursk border region and Russia in the Kharkov and central Donbass area of Donetsk. Further new fronts are likely.

It is estimated that Russia’s total forces in Ukraine ranges today, late summer 2024, are between 600,000 (per Ukraine) and 700,000 (per Russia Ministry of Defense). Ukraine’s total available forces are around 350,000. Behind these numbers, however, both sides are mobilizing further additional forces not yet committed to the line of combat. Ukraine is hurriedly recruiting and training another 150,000 while Russia reportedly has another 400,000 in its total armed forces located elsewhere in Russia. Russia additionally plans to have an army of 1.4 million by year end which suggests additional combat reserves of perhaps 300,000 in addition to its 700,000 combat brigades now in Ukraine.

So Russia today has a roughly 2 to 1 numerical superiority in both combat troops in Ukraine as well as potential reserves. What a Russian force of 700,000 in Ukraine today—and even 1 million by year end—means is that Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) is simply not a sufficient force to conquer all of Ukraine. Nor was it ever intended to be when Russia in February 2022 entered Ukraine with an SMO combat force of less than 100,000.

With combat forces even at 1m by year end, short of an unlikely total collapse of Ukraine’s army, the SMO is not sufficient to take Kiev or Odessa; and it’s certainly not sufficient to invade NATO as some war hawks in the west like to argue in order to justify more direct NATO involvement in the war.

By way of historical comparison, it took the Soviet Union a 13 million man army to push the Nazis out of its territory; at least a third or 4 million of which were engaged in its southern Ukrainian front alone.

While Russia has a clear, albeit not overwhelming edge, in combat forces in Ukraine today, military success is not just a function of absolute numbers but of how well forces can be concentrated at a given front to enable a numerical advantage for a time over one’s adversary. Other factors play a tactical role as well—like the element of surprise, the quantity and quality of reserves that can be marshalled at critical points and times in the conflict, the mobility of one’s forces to be quickly deployed, and the ability to deceive one’s opponent as to where, when and how much force will be concentrated.

While important, and even at times decisive, these latter factors (reserves, surprise, mobility, etc.) are nonetheless secondary; concentration of force is always the primary military tactic. And so far we have seen both Ukraine and Russia concentrate their respective forces, albeit in different fronts separated by hundreds of kilometers. The question is which front is strategically the more important.

The Key Strategic Event of 2024

The key event of the war this summer 2024 is Russia’s concentration of numerically and qualitatively superior forces in the central Donbass area. Russia has enjoyed a numerical advantage in combat forces in the Donbass as well as in air superiority and missile-artillery forces for at least the past year since the collapse of Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive. This Russian advantage and superiority in Donbass has been further increased this summer 2024 as result of Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbass this summer of some of its own best brigades. Ukraine sent these best brigades from the Donbass to the north Kursk border region to participate on August 6 in Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk territory. That shift of Ukraine forces left its Donbass front weakly defended. In contrast, Russia has not shifted any of its forces from Donbass to the Kursk front but has increased its forces in Donbass. This event is perhaps the single most important strategic shift in the war this summer 2024.

Which front and offensive—Ukraine’s Kursk or Russia’s Donbass—is more important for the eventual outcome of the war will likely be decided in the coming months, and definitely before year end 2024.

In the battles now underway in these two fronts—Kursk and Donbass— we may in effect be witnessing the beginning of the endgame of the war in Ukraine.

As result of Ukraine’s withdrawals of some of its best brigades from the Donbass, Russian forces are now having increasing success on that front taking village after village and driving west toward the key Ukraine strongholds of Pokrovsk in central Donbass, as well as toward Slavyansk in northern Donbass. Should Russia take Pokrovsk and Slavyansk, the war in eastern Ukraine will be effectively over—at least in those former provinces Lughansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhie and Kherson in eastern Ukraine. The line of combat will almost certainly then move quickly far to the west to the Dnipr river.

In contrast, it’s difficult to see what strategically Ukraine hopes to achieve by its penetration into Russia’s Kursk province. Will it turn the tide of the war in favor of Ukraine? That is highly unlikely given Russia’s continuing advantage in combat forces, weapons and air superiority. Which raises the question: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives for its Kursk offensive and can it attain them?

Ukraine’s Kursk Summer Offensive

Launched on August 6, 2024 Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has had some initial success. Ukraine initially concentrated numerically superior forces at the Kursk border (as it had earlier in the summer at the Kharkov border southeast of Kursk).

In the run up to its August Kursk offensive, Ukraine publicly announced its troop concentrations opposite Kursk and north of Kharkov city were strictly defensive moves to prepare for expected Russia invasions from the north which were being rumored to be imminent throughout the spring 2024. In hindsight, however, Ukraine’s announcement that its forces at the Kharkov and Kursk borders were strictly defensive appears to have been a military deception. Ukraine’s military recently revealed that Ukraine had been preparing back in June for an offensive into Russia at Kursk.

The question then arises: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives moving troops from the Donbass and other areas of Ukraine (also from the Belarus-Ukraine border) and concentrating them on its northern Kharkov and Kursk border? If it was not for defense against a new Russian offensive in the north but to launch an offensive of its own, what were (and are) Ukraine’s objectives?

In preparation for it Kursk offensive this August, Ukraine transferred combat brigades from all over Ukraine and concentrated them at the Kursk border in July—including many of its best brigades in Donbass as well as some of its 95,000 in defensive positions at the Kharkov border. Ukraine reportedly even moved troops from its Belarus border to Kursk, enabled apparently by an agreement with Belarus to reduce their respective forces from the Belarus-Ukraine border (an agreement that reportedly has been recently rescinded). Finally, Ukraine also rushed some of its new drafted recruits with minimal training to its Kursk region in preparation for the Kursk offensive as well.

In short, Ukraine moved up to a third of its total brigades to the Kursk region. That is probably around 150,000, perhaps half of which are actual combat brigades. A reduced force was left at Vovchansk and a seriously depleted force in the Donbass. In addition, some Ukraine brigades reportedly have returned to the Belarus border since the August offensive.

With an amassed combat force of around 70,000 Ukraine easily overwhelmed Russia’s thinly guarded Kursk border which was manned with border guards and other untested units—even though Ukraine invaded Kursk initially with 12,000 or so. Since August 6 it has brought up and concentrated at least another 60,000 or so.

This perhaps suggests Ukraine is not finished with crossing the border into Russia elsewhere along the northern border. Some analysts suggest Ukraine plans to open another offensive further northwest of Kursk in what’s called the Bryansk border region. Or alternatively just southwest of Kursk in the Belgorod border.

There is even some rumor of another offensive in the far southwest of Zaporozhie province by Ukraine, targeting the taking of the Zaporozhie nuclear power plant currently under Russian control. Where Ukraine might marshall such additional combat forces is debatable, however.

In response, Russia initially brought in special forces and marines to check Ukraine’s advance which has slowed significantly. And reportedly mechanized forces are en route to the Kursk front from other locations in Russia. The Kursk pocket has now become perhaps the most intense killing field of the war to date.
What the Kursk and other possible Ukraine offensives and fronts suggests is that Ukraine is desperate to get Russia to shift its superior and increasingly effective forces from the Donbass in order to slow Russia’s accelerating advances there. But so far it appears Russia has not done so.

Russia’s Kharkov-Vovchansk Offensive

There’s another parallel story here: Before Ukraine’s August offensive into Kursk, Russian forces in early May had entered Ukraine’s Kharkov province near the Ukrainian border city of Vovchansk located just 25miles north of Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkov. That Russian offensive was launched with a small force of only 15-20,000 even though Russia knew Ukraine had concentrated 95,000 troops in a defensive line just south of the border. The result was predictable: the Russian offensive into Kharkov became quickly bogged down and a stalemate resulted there around the city of Vovchansk, at least until very recently.
A second parallel question therefore arises: why did Russia cross the border near Kharkov-Vovchansk with such an insufficient concentration of forces, facing off against what it knew were reportedly 95,000 Ukrainian troops dug in defensive positions? Clearly the objective could not have been to take Kharkov city. So then what was it?

Russia’s Donbass Offensive

The most important strategic military development this summer 2024 in the war is not Ukraine’s invasion at Kursk. It is that to enable its Kursk offensive Ukraine has left its Donbass front seriously weakened. So weak in fact that Russia’s offensive in the Donbass is intensifying almost daily with growing success.

There are three directions in which Russia is driving west in the Donbass. The most important is the central Donbass where Russia is virtually at the gates of the strategic hub Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a railway and road intersection that feeds Ukraine forces most of its weapons and supplies to central and southern Donbass. If it falls to Russia, supplies to most of its forces in central Donbass are at great risk. Equally important, west of Pokrovsk there are few lines and fortifications for Ukraine defense operations. The road is open to the Dnipr river to the far west, the next natural line of defense by Ukraine. But the Dnipr represents the loss of all of Donetsk province and its complete liberation by Russia.

Just further north of Pokrovsk lies a similarly strategic city of Slavyansk and its neighboring largest city of Kramatorsk. Slavyansk is the analog in terms of Ukraine logistical support for the northern Donbass. If it too falls so too does all of the remainder of northern Donetsk and Lughansk province. Russian advances have also begun in this region, through Siversk and Izyum.

In short, if Pokrovsk and Slavyansk fall to Russia it’s game over in the Donbass front to Ukraine. Russia advances suggest this is likely before the US November elections or soon after. The point is Ukraine’s withdrawal of some of its best forces from Donbass, to its Kursk front, as no doubt accelerated Russia’s gains now underway in the Donbass. And if Donbass falls, Ukraine has no choice but to exit its positions further south at the Zaporozhie border as well, or else be encircled there.

The events in recent months in Donbass thus raises yet a third strategic question: Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice the Donbass in order to launch its Kursk offensive?

Military analysts on both sides seem uncertain as to why Ukraine and Russia have made the decisions they have at this critical juncture of the war in summer 2024—Russia last May in Kharkov, Ukraine this summer in Donbass and today Kursk, and Russia’s decision to hold firm to its offensive in Donbass.

So what are some of the possible explanations being bandied about by analysts trying to explain these objectives of these two offensives—Ukraine in Kursk and Russia in Kharkov-Donbass?

Some Unanswered Strategic Questions:

Let’s summarize these strategic questions and offer some possible answers.

Question 1. Why Did Ukraine Invade Kursk, what are its possible objectives, and can it attain those objectives:

Military analysts are all over the map with speculation as to why Ukraine invaded Kursk. Some say the objective was seize the Russian nuclear power plant located just south of the city of Kursk and less than 100 miles from the border. By seizing the plant Ukraine would then use it as a blackmail piece in negotiations with Russia.

Another objective raised is that Ukraine intends to use the territory captured as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia, which it appears several third party countries have been trying to arrange—albeit thus far without success.

In terms of military tactics, still another speculation goes, the Ukrainian invasion was intended to force Russia to transfer brigades from its Donbass front to Kursk, and thereby slow down Russia’s advances in the Donbass that appear to be accelerating.

Yet another speculation is Ukraine intended to create a buffer zone along the border before Russia launched its own offensive into Ukraine in the region. That suggests the Ukrainian invasion was to pre-empt Russia opening an offensive front of its own along the northern border.

Another view is that the true objective of Ukraine’s offensive has been to make Putin appear weak to Russian elites and public who are now demanding a more aggressive Russian response to the invasion. The Kursk offensive, according to this view, is to provoke Russia to a more extreme aggressive response that would enable Zelensky to receive more lethal military aid from NATO—like UK Storm Shadow and US ATACMS missiles and missile carrying F-16s—and NATO permission to use them to attack deep inside Russia.

It is possible that a little of all the above are motivations for Ukraine’s offensive: So far as seizing the Kursk nuclear plant is concerned, if that were the objective it has been neutralized and Ukraine has virtually no chance of reaching the Kursk plant any longer now that massive Russian defenses now block its path.

The explanation that the Kursk offensive’s objective is to force Russia to move military units from Donbass to Kursk has also apparently failed to date. Russia has sufficient reserves elsewhere in Russia proper and is moving those to the Kursk front.

The speculation that Zelensky authorized the Kursk offensive as a ‘land for land’ bargaining chip in future negotiations is also negated by recent events since August 6: Putin has publicly stated there will be no negotiations with Ukraine so long as its forces remain on Russian territory, whether in Kursk or Donbass.

The idea of Ukraine obtaining a buffer has never been convincing. Why would Ukraine deplete its military resources elsewhere and risk losing more territory (Donbass) in order to protect territory (North Border) it hadn’t even lost yet?

It seems therefore that the most likely objective of the Ukraine Kursk offensive was, and remains, political: to provoke Russia into an extreme response in order for Ukraine to restore fading western support for Ukraine to continue the war. Zelensky needs Russia to escalate to remain in power in Ukraine. Throughout NATO, support is waning for providing military arms and ammunition. The west further believes that funding Ukraine’s war and economy is settled, provided by the seized $300 billion of Russian assets. However, Western Media almost daily has become increasingly critical of the war, recognizing it cannot be won. Zelensky thus needs to show Ukraine still has the ability to fight and NATO needs to provide even more weaponry because Russia is escalating the war!

Zelensky realizes he needs more direct NATO troop involvement—not just weaponry. Currently NATO is participating in ground operations with technicians operating advanced NATO weapons, mercenaries, as well as senior NATO officers and war planners on the ground. It will need even more. It can’t impress NATO to provide more by losses in the Donbass. But it might convince NATO war hawks to do so by offensives into Russia like Kursk.

2. Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice Donbass?

Evidence on the ground strongly suggests Ukraine may have decided to sacrifice territory in the Donbass and perhaps the entire region altogether. Its Donbass defense was beginning to crack well before the Kursk offensive, ever since loss of the strategic Donbass city of Avdeyevka earlier this year. Now losses there are accelerating after Ukraine pulled some of its best brigades from Donbass and moved them to Kursk.

For Ukraine, the northern Kursk front is strategically more important than Donbass. Its bargaining position in eventual future negotiations with Russia and western support in general was weakening so long as it was losing Donbass. Seizing Russian territory in the north might shore up that loss of support and strengthen its position. In short, protecting Kharkov city and Ukraine territory outside Russia’s four provinces in the east is strategically more important to Ukraine than holding on to the Donbass. Ukraine can’t hold onto the Donbass in the end and NATO and Ukraine both know it. Opinion in the west increasingly suggests Ukraine should agree to give up Donbass and the four provinces. But Ukraine cannot simply retreat in the Donbass and give it up without appearing weak or is about to lose the war. That would accelerate NATO withdrawal of support. Zelensky therefore needed another success elsewhere if Ukraine was inevitably about to lose Donbass. Thus the Kursk offensive.

3. Why did Russia invade Kharkov region with an insufficient force?

Russia crossed over the border early last May in the Kharkov region but not to capture the large Ukraine city of Kharkov. That would take perhaps a Russian offensive force of at least half a million. Russia obviously knew, moreover, that a large Ukrainian force of up to 95,000 per reports was concentrated between the border and Kharkov city itself barely 50 miles away to the south.

So why then did Russian open that front with only 15-20,000 troops? The only possible explanation is Russia entered Kharkov with an insufficient force to get Ukraine to withdraw forces from the Donbass to protect Kharkov, which it did. Otherwise the explanation for throwing a force of 15,000 at 90,000 was military folly. And there’s no evidence throughout the war Russia has been militarily foolish in its offensive force deployments.

4. Did Russia get caught by surprise by the Kursk invasion?

It has to be admitted Russia was clearly caught off guard by Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. It might have been misled by Ukraine’s deception that its amassing of forces on the Ukraine side of the Kursk border in the summer was strictly defensive, designed to confront Russia should it have itself invaded at that location. It is also possible Russia may have viewed US/NATO limitations to date on Ukraine’s use of ATACMS and cruise missiles to attack deep inside Russia as evidence Ukraine was not allowed by NATO/US to escalate attacks directly into Russia. Before August 6 Ukraine’s attacking inside Russia was limited to Ukrainian drones.

Russia may have interpreted these NATO limits meant Ukraine would not be given the ‘green light’ to cross the Russian border with large ground forces. This—combined with Russia misreading Ukraine’s concentration of forces on its side of the border as only defensive—may have led Russia to erroneously assume Ukraine would not mount an offensive into Kursk.

5. Are we witnessing the growing importance of reserves in the war?

As the war now has passed its two and a half year mark, it is clearly beginning to wear on both sides in terms of men and materiel. The availability of sufficient reserves is therefore beginning to play a relatively more important role as the war has continued. Not just reserves in the sense of the number of available combat troops but their combat experience, training, and availability of weapons and ammunition are becoming an increasingly critical factor in the conduct of the war. This is often the case in war as the conflict becomes protracted, except when one side has an overwhelming force advantage of the other. That may have been the case in US wars in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, Panama, and elsewhere. But it wasn’t in Viet Nam and it isn’t in Ukraine. Here Russia’s longer term advantage in reserves has begun to show.

It is true Russia in refusing to move reserves from Donbass has had to commit reserves from elsewhere in Russia but it has such reserves. Ukraine does not. The Kursk offensive shows Ukraine has probably committed most of its remaining reserves to that front. And it had to move brigades from Belarus, Kharkov and Donbass for the Kursk offensive—and to cut short training of new drafted recruits. Ukraine is approaching the end of its human reserves and cannot get an increase in weapons and ammunition from NATO that it requires if the war intensifies, as it is now, in both Kursk and Donbass. NATO has arrange continued funding for Ukraine throughout 2025 by seizing Russia’s $300B assets in G7 banks that were frozen at the outset of the war.

NATO’s provision of weapons is slowing, moreover, as NATO inventories are drying up; it can no longer accelerate the delivery of weapons to Ukraine as it did in 2022-23. Nor politically does NATO have the will to provide soldiers on the ground directly into Ukraine, although it is building the largest military and air base in NATO now in eastern Romania within tens of miles from Odessa where it already has stationed thousands of French and US airborne troops. If NATO does intervene ever on the ground it will mostly like be to prevent Russia seizure of the critical Ukraine seaport of Odessa, without which even a rump state of Ukraine in the west cannot be sustained.

6. What are Russia’s strategic options with regard to the Kursk invasion? Its Donbass Offensive?

Russian strategy will not change much in the Donbass. It will continue to advance, likely even more rapidly. Ukraine’s forces in Donbass may even collapse there before year end, with Ukraine retreating west to the Dnipr river and thus abandoning any hold on territory that comprises Russia’s four provinces. As for the Kursk front, Russia will most likely seal off the currently occupying Ukrainian force, bring up new Russian armored division, artillery and air forces and continue to batter those Ukrainian forces in the pocket until they weaken and retreat of their own accord. That will likely happen soon after the US November elections. Ukraine will try to hold on to Kursk to try to ensure further US support before Biden leaves office next January. The odds are significant, however, it will not be able to succeed in that.

Political Consequences of the Kursk-Donbass Offensives

Public opinion in Russia has strengthened Putin’s hand in the war as a consequence of the two offensives. His problem now is not ensuring Russian public opinion continues to support his government and the SMO but that growing segments of Russian opinion and Russian media are now demanding he take even more aggressive military action in response to the Kursk invasion.

Putin’s challenge now is to not fall for Ukraine’s Kursk provocation, abandon the SMO and escalate the conflict to an even more intensive and wider war that would require a much larger military force than the SMO and falling into the NATO war hawks trap to use a Russian escalation as an excuse to get NATO even more directly involved on the ground in the war than it already is.

Zelensky clearly wants to maneuver events into that direction—i.e. a more direct Russia-NATO conflict. That’s perhaps the major rationale behind the Kursk offensive. But Putin ultimately wants some kind of negotiated settlement, albeit on Russia’s two terms announced earlier this summer. He will therefore likely wait until the outcome of US elections to determine whether abandoning the SMO for a larger conflict is necessary. Zelensky and Ukraine leadership is desperate and reckless; Putin is calculating and typically factors in the bigger political picture.

For the moment, however, Putin’s conditions for beginning negotiations announced a couple months ago—i.e. Ukraine leave the four provinces and agree to neutrality—is off the table.

Scuttling the possibility of negotiations (that China was trying to arrange last July) may have also been part of the objective of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Ukraine and Zelensky have a long track record of feigning interest in negotiations as a cover for an escalation planned. Ukraine diplomatic maneuvers in Beijing in July and in Qatar in August are evidence Ukraine has no intention of seriously negotiating anything. Quite the contrary. Although nothing is imminent, US and Russia may continue exploring the possibility of negotiations through back channels, as they have in recent months, but it’s clear there will be no negotiations of any kind until after the US elections at earliest and more likely not until the Biden administration ends next January 20, 2025.

Throughout the summer opinion has been growing among NATO elites and western media that Ukraine cannot hold onto the Donbass or even the four provinces annexed in 2022 by Russia. Russia’s continuing successes in the Donbass offensive further confirm that view, and solidify it should Russia take Pokrovsk next month. Conversely, NATO elite opinion may shift further toward allowing Ukraine to attack inside Russia using ATACMS, cruise missiles, and even F-16s to enable Ukraine to hold onto the Kursk territory as Ukraine losses the Donbass. The test of this NATO elites’ shift will be evident should US allow in coming weeks further shipments of UK storm shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. Losing the Donbass logically means rolling the military dice even further in Kursk and the northern border.

US neocons and war hawks will attempt to create further escalation in the Ukraine war between now and January 2025 in order to make it extremely difficult for any new US president elected in November to reduce US/NATO commitments to Ukraine, let alone withdraw.

Should Harris win in November, the Biden administration policies toward the war will almost certainly continue. Harris will be malleable to the foreign policy/neocon establishment who have been running US foreign policy and wars since at least 2001 and perhaps even earlier since the late 1990s. Should Trump win—and the Deep State allow him to actually take office in January without a major US constitutional crisis (which is more likely than not)—it is unlikely that Trump will be able to end the Ukraine war in the short run after taking office January 20. Even with Trump in office, the war will therefore continue well into 2025. The only factor that may expedite an earlier end to the war is if Russia debilitates Ukraine military resources to such an extent that those forces effectively collapse in both the Donbass and Kursk fronts.

Russia has never intended to ‘conquer’ all of Ukraine, including Kiev. Putin’s SMO has always been to drive Ukrainian forces out of the Russian speaking provinces and then ensure some kind of neutrality by what’s left of a Ukrainian state.

But before that can happen Russia will need to conclusively drive Ukraine back across the border from Kursk and take the strategic Donbass cities of Pokrovsk and Slavyansk. Only then is Endgame apparent. Only then will Ukraine forces retreat back to whatever remains of Ukraine. Only then will US/NATO decide to cut losses and abandon the ‘Ukraine Project’ altogether.

Dr. Jack Rasmus is author of The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy From Reagan to Trump, Clarity Press, 2020 and the forthcoming Twilight of American Imperialism, 2024, also Clarity Press. He blogs at http://jackrasmus.com, hosts the weekly radio show, Alternative Visions, and posts daily on ‘X’ at @drjackrasmus.

Watch my most recent YouTube presentation to the northern California Green Party on the actual state of the US economy on eve of the US elections. Topics addressed include is there a ‘soft landing’ underway? Dissecting the US GDP, inflation and jobs reports for more detail suggests actually higher inflation and recession already underway in the US goods sector (manufacturing, industrial output, exports, construction, jobs market and even real retail sales). Why the US price indexes under-estimate prices and jobs reports over-estimate jobs growth. The presentation also comments on recent tech bubble, Japan carry trade instability, and accelerating expansion of the BRICS and what it means for US dollar and influence in 2025 and after.

To Watch GO TO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaJ8HVw3UTg

Listen to my last friday’s, August 16, 2024, Alternative Visions radio show for my latest comments on the Ukraine war (Kursk, Kharhov, Donbass fronts), including a review of the recent Wall St. Journal article on how rogue Ukraine officers and businessmen were behind the Sept. 2022 bombing of the Norstream pipeline. Plus why Iran has not yet retaliated against Israel (and may not). Concluding with a breakdown of the US CPI and PPI inflation reports last week and why the inflation rate is actually, or about to be, higher in both.

TO LISTEN GO TO:

https://alternativevisions.podbean.com/e/alternative-visions-ukraine-war-update-cpi-ppi-inflation-reports/

Listen to my initial take on the dynamics behind last week’s Yen carry trade & Asian stock markets and the deflating Tech bubble in the USA, as billionaire Warren Buffet sells off $80B of his Apple stock. This short radio interview only 15 minutes. (Tune in to my Alternative Visions show of Friday, August 9, 2pm eastern on the Progressive Radio Network for a more in depth analysis of the same.)

For initial radio interview here with Critical Hour radio GO TO:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SPqEj4FrjSYuHg4vCkRSg-1E7vSIHCec/view

Listen to my Friday, August 2, Alternative Visions radio show where the topics are preparations for wide war in middle east continue + US real economy now indicating not just chronic inflation but multiple signs of real slowdown (manufacturing PMIs, Construction, real (goods) retail sales contraction and jobs market) as well. Why the Aug 2 jobs numbers are even worse than reported, when Labor Dept., 2nd jobs survey, the CPS, that covers more small businesses is considered. Why the tech sector bubble is now bursting (including early AI boom) and why Services sector will later follow. Goods sector recession now underway and Services sector next. Meanwhile, US political candidates are totally ignorant of the major crisis in $ and US empire coming in 2025 along with US recession.

To Listen Go To: https://alternativevisions.podbean.com/e/alternative-visions-war-in-middle-east-us-economy-flips-over/

Listen to my recent hour long interview on the ‘Great Distraction’ in the US 2024 election. Why both parties mostly ignore the economy and immigration, which polls show as top voter concern. Why national opinion polls are irrelevant and why what happens in seven swing states determines the election. Why Trump has advantage in the swing states still even after Biden’s withdrawal. Review of data on immigration since 2020 and how Trump is leveraging the issue and is particularly targeting issues in swing states while Dems are not. Why election will probably come down to who wins northern tier of WI, MI, PA. Harris needs to win all 3 but Trump needs only one to get 270 electoral votes. Why inflation is higher than reported by media in govt official CPI and PCE index reports and some examples why is higher than reported. Other topics on US and global economy are discussed including why US real economy is now slowing fast and why both presidential candidates are ignoring the big global economic news of expansion of the BRICS and decline of US dollar coming 2025.

TO LISTEN GO TO: 

Two recent short (15min) radio interviews in 3rd week of July 2024 on Decadence of US political parties and US sanctions impact on US and EU economies.

(Election 2024 Bombshells & Deep Money Control of Parties & Elections)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c9Va5uv5mikpmJJ8ol_LK-fytTcC6uVc/view

(US Sanctions and $300 Russia Assets Seizure Economic Impact on Europe)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lMdOQQZuIC4H0sXjknRtRPqwbqtoBeMh/view

Listen to my July 26 Alternative Visions radio show commentary on Biden’s 11min. capitulation speech’s 3 big lies about the US economy, immigration and wars + first look at US GDP 2nd Qtr and why it’s 1.6% annual growth and not reported 2.8% + Ukraine negotiations in Beijing & Israel’s imminent next war in Lebanon.

TO LISTEN GO TO:

https://alternativevisions.podbean.com/e/alternative-visions-biden-s-withdrawal-speech-us-2nd-quarter-gdp-first-look-us-wars-update/

by Jack Rasmus
copyright 2024

“The 2024 election may be like no other. In less than a month—from June 27 to July 21—three bombshells have gone off. Anyone thinking that’s the end of it is politically naïve.

The first political explosion was Biden’s June 27 presidential debate performance. His subsequent public addresses to the NAACP convention and other venues fared no better. Overnight the key issue in the 2024 election became Biden’s mental competency.

The second bombshell was the assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the fallout from the event raising the question why the US secret service performed so pathetically providing protection.

The third event occurred this weekend when President Biden threw in the towel and exited the campaign.

But as the saying goes: “The past is prologue”. Similar bombshell events are therefore likely ahead.

The next event may be the Democrat party convention in Chicago a month from now, notwithstanding the current appearance that the Democrat party has closed ranks and is now behind Kamala Harris.

Then there’s the 2nd presidential debate coming in September, followed by the conduct of the November election itself. Either event may provide yet another ‘bombshell’. Any semblance of vote manipulation—or even the perception thereof—in November could erupt into widespread civil disobedience with unknown consequences for the electoral college processes that take place from November to January 2025.

In between Biden’s exit this past weekend and the November election, any number of crises on the foreign policy front are also possible now that Biden is lame a duck and the issue of his competency has simply moved from his ability to campaign to can he still govern the country. It’s quite possible that the neocons running US foreign policy and US wars the past two years may now run amuck. They will want to ‘ lock in’ support for continuing US war policies for any next administration—specifically Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, and possibly escalate confrontation with China in the south China sea as well.

The official story behind Biden’s exit is that his poll numbers were bad and moving in the wrong direction. The well respected Emerson College poll showed Biden behind in key swing states like Arizona, North Caroline, Georgia, and Pennsylvania by margins of 5%-10% but behind by margins of only 3% in Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin. Hardly a un-closeable gap.

National polls of voters margins are totally irrelevant here; the archaic US electoral college system determines presidential elections and that means the swing states will determine who wins. Nevertheless, national polls showed Biden and Trump within 1-2 points of each other. Other presidents going into elections have had similar poor numbers and weren’t dumped by their party.
So what’s changed? What’s changed is the extreme role and influence of money and wealthy donors within the two political parties and in high stakes US national elections.

Has Money Corrupted Democracy Beyond Repair?

It’s an easily documented fact that the movement to get Biden to leave originated with the big money donors of the Democrat party. They quickly suspended at least $90 million in donations to the Biden campaign after the June 27 presidential debate. That’s what the media reported. It was probably more.

Second Tier Democrat party leaders thereafter, one by one, came out publicly suggesting Biden should leave the campaign. Meanwhile, Tier 1 leaders of the party (Obama, Pelosi, and soon after Shumer, Jeffries and others) worked behind the scenes. Notoriously absent from their ranks, however, were the Clintons, both Bill and Hillary, who remained in support of Biden. So did the Democrats’ black caucus kingmaker, James Clyburn, Representative from South Carolina who played a key role in manipulating Biden’s nomination in 2020 and who has wielded inordinate power within the party the last decade
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But it was the donors who set the Biden exit train in motion and kept it going.

This all raises the question how deeply American electoral democracy has been corrupted by money. And suggests strongly the system has shifted significantly along the Democracy-Oligarchy spectrum toward the latter. History will no doubt show that this shift has been occurring for at least the last quarter century.

The Supreme Court has played a central role in promoting the shift, starting with its selection in 2000 of George Bush as president by suspending ballot counting in Florida. The next milestone was the Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010 that ruled not only corporations are people but as people enjoy the same rights as actual people under the US Constitution and that campaign contributions are the equivalent of free speech. The Court further chipped away at electoral democracy thereafter by gutting the Voting Rights Act of the 1960s and approving State legislatures’ gerrymandering districts for their members of the House of Representatives. As a result to this day, despite 450 seats in the US House of Representatives up for re-election every two years, no more than 50 or so seats are ever competitive.

We see the same decline in democracy within the political parties. Democrat party donors on July 21 de-selected their candidate, Biden, after having selected him in phony primaries held by the party earlier this year. Both selecting and de-selecting were conducted by party leaders in consultation with wealthy donors who are now allowed to manipulate American elections as never before. Republican party primaries were no less perfunctory.

Mainstream parties have become obstacles to Democracy not its enablers. As the Supreme Court recently ruled, the parties don’t have to be ‘democratic’ in their functioning. They are just ‘clubs’ according to the Court.

We hear a lot about the US Constitution nowadays. When I do I can’t help but think of James Madison, its greatest architect, and 3rd president of the United States, who warned in his contribution to the Federalist papers—which were public arguments published by Madison and others while the US Constitution was being voted on in 1787 by the 13 states—that the young country should beware of political parties and their potential to corrupt democracy. His warning is right up there with George Washington’s beware of entanglements in European wars. And Thomas Jefferson’s that every couple generations or so a revolution is necessary to give rebirth to Democracy.

The efforts by Republicans and Trump to short circuit democracy are also well known. Republican red state legislatures are champions of voter suppression. Less known are the Democrat party’s own efforts in recent years: Since 2016 that party has launched a nation wide campaign to deny independent 3rd parties from ballot status. It has blocked campaign funds for them. It has manipulated primaries to ‘select’ rather than elect nominees through open competition. It has engaged in ‘lawfare’ against opposing candidates, not just Trump. Prevented free and open debates in its own ranks. Like their Republican counterparts, it has engaged in gerrymandering at the state level. And has blocked secret service protection for challengers like RFKjr and green party presidential candidate, Jill Stein.

The leadership of both political parties have become more un-democratic, arrogantly believing it is best to ‘manage’ their constituencies rather than listen to and represent them. And that arrogance and manipulation has deepened in parallel to the deepening influence of money and donors.

Wealthy donors are—like their corporations—undemocratic by nature. Their corporations are not bastions of democracy. They are run top down. No one votes in corporations. Decisions are made in secret, closed door committees. That cultural practice has been transferred to political party leaders as party leaders have become increasingly dependent on money from their wealthy donors. The two cultures—corporate and political party—have been converging fused ever so tightly by their mutual addiction to money.

Politicos like to say ‘Money is the mother’s milk of politics’. That’s the wrong metaphor. What they should say is money is the street drug destroying democracy: Wealthy donors, corporate and individual, are the pushers and political party leaders have become the addicts.

A Return to Key Issues?

Now that Biden has left the campaign, the matter of his mental competency is off the table as the key issue in the election. Now it’s back to the real issues.

According to Pew Research, in its earlier 2024 poll the top issue is the economy for 73% of the respondents polled. That means inflation, jobs, high interest rates, housing affordability, healthcare costs, and a host of related economic issues. All other issues were secondary to varying degree, including immigration (58%), crime (57%), illegal drugs (55%), protecting the environment (45%).

However, since the start of summer 2024, Gallup polls show that immigration and related issues have risen sharply in voters concern. It is now the second most important issue.

Immigration has serves as an umbrella issue: Republicans have been cleverly manipulating it as such. It’s not immigration per se but its negative consequences that voters are concerned with—like crime, jobs, housing, social security, etc.

Trump has been emphasizing anecdotal stories of former criminals allowed in the country, released by Biden administration at the border and subsequently performing crimes, especially against women. He’s also tied immigration to the homeless vets issue by saying immigrants get to stay in hotels at government-taxpayer expense while homeless vets languish on street corners and under highway underpasses. There’s also a tie in to social security, which is allegedly in trouble since immigrants get disability checks and credit cards with $1000 balances causing pressure on social security Trust funds.

Noteworthy is that reproductive rights does not poll high among voters concerns in legitimate polls like Pew and Gallup. Thus Republicans appear to be focusing more closely on the sentiment of voters than Democrats, who seem to think that reproductive rights will prove the issue that will put them over the top in the election in swing states which is highly doubtful.

The state of the economy is the second primary issue among voters. Democrats focus on the recent reduction in inflation, citing the Consumer Price Index over the past year rising at only 3.2%. However, the public does not seem to agree, which has resulted in editorials in the mainstream media by perplexed authors who can’t understand why the public and voters just don’t get it that the economy is doing great. Democrats like also to emphasize the US economy is performing so much better than foreign economies.

The problem with this Democrat messaging is that voters, as consumers, don’t care as much that prices for goods may have leveled off in recent months. What they remember is the past four years and that prices today remain at high levels, even if not rising as fast as before.

When compared to the start of the Biden administration, gasoline prices per gallon are still 38% higher, the most often purchased groceries are up 35%, bread 52%, chicken 37%, eggs 114%, milk 24%, and even big Mac meal 27%. Food and gasoline are considered Goods in the government inflation indexes and have been bringing down the rate of increase in the inflation indexes over the past year. But Services in the indexes have continued rising even over the past year and remain stuck at around 5% and probably much higher. Goods are given greater weighting in the government inflation indexes which explains why the indexes have abated over the short term. But important categories of Services like rents, auto insurance and repairs, medical insurance, utility services, etc. have continued rising 5%-20% over the past year and over the past four years even more.

Moreover, the CPI and PCE inflation indexes are misleading and under-estimate inflation for various reasons. As just one example: neither of the inflation indexes include the category of credit costs’ impact on family budgets, i.e. interest rates that consumers pay. Mortgage interest payments have risen 114% as rates have risen since early 2022. Democrats forget that people don’t make house payments to the builder; they make mortgage payments to the banker. The problem of higher interest rates extends beyond mortgages. Households are paying more for credit cards, student loans, auto loans and installment loans in general. These higher payments significantly impact household budgets and convince voters that the cost of living is out of control.

Perhaps a more telling statistic that almost never gets mentioned by media, mainstream economists or politicians is that household debt as a percent of family income is now 54%. Much of family disposable income now consequently goes to bankers and millions of households have to do with less of the necessities in order to make those interest payments monthly. Or else they just don’t make them, like the 19 million student loan debtors who have simply refused to resume payments on their loans after the Covid era student loan moratorium expired.

The Democrat and pundits claim that the ‘economy is doing great’ just doesn’t ring true for millions of households who vote. And their ancillary claim the US economy is doing better than other countries is viewed with disdain. Voters could care less.

In short, immigration and the economy are the dominant issues for voters as election 2024 kicks into high gear. And Republicans appear to have their finger on that pulse more accurately than do the Democrats.

Some Important Unanswered Questions

The first obvious question is ‘why did the Democrat party leadership schedule a first election presidential debate in June’, many months before the election? This writer does not recall any debate held so early. What was the purpose? Did party leaders know Biden could not perform in a campaign and put him out there early to verify? And once he failed, donors and party leaders moved swiftly to remove him.

The story in mainstream media is that Biden advisers were keeping it secret how far his mental acuity had deteriorated. But that’s hard to believe. There were many public events at which he spoke before June that made it obvious. And to argue that no one leaked any of Biden’s performance at cabinet meetings to other party leaders like Obama and Pelosi is not convincing. More likely the planning to remove Biden was set in motion at high levels of the party well before the first presidential debate. Perhaps even before it was decided not to have primary debates last February.

A second question has to do with the Trump assassination attempt. It is becoming clear that secret service protection of Trump was more than lax. Given the official Democrat vitriol about Trump as destroyer of democracy, and the country itself, that was intensifying over the summer, one would have thought more, not less, secret service protection for Trump would have been justified and provided. The counter argument that the service was short of funds doesn’t calculate either, in that the service is still sitting on a fund of $3.1 billion for the election. In the past year the lack of protection was in fact obvious to the Trump campaign, as it repeatedly requested more agents be assigned to Trump speaking events—only to be turned down by the secret service according to both the New York Times and Washington Post in recent months.

Then there’s the related question, why hasn’t the Biden administration approved any service protection at all for RFKjr? He continues to poll 18-12% voters and could easily upend any Democrat candidate in the election. But Democrat leaders have consistently scuttled all efforts by the RFKjr campaign to get secret service protection. Finally, why is it that the Biden administration provides to this day protection for former Ukraine president Zelensky—but not for RFKjr and inadequately for Trump? Zelensky isn’t even president of Ukraine any longer since his term ran out back in May 2024 and no new elections have been held or scheduled.

A third question is what happens next in the weeks up to the late August Democrat Party convention in Chicago? While it appears that the party leaders are rallying behind vice president Kamala Harris, it is not assured she will prevail at the convention. The delegates are free to vote for whomever they want, although the party’s at large 1500 super-delegates are always positioned to determine the outcome at conventions according to the wishes of party leadership should a decision they don’t like by delegates appears imminent.

Whether Harris prevails and is the party nominee in the end will be determined by how many donors return to the party fold under her in the next few weeks. Reportedly about half the $90 million have done so but it remains to be seen if the rest follow. Democrat party leaders have shown the money is priority #1. If she falters, another will surely be chosen come convention time.

The Democrat party fundraising remains in deep trouble. It appears its once firm hold on big tech money is fragmenting. Trump’s choice of JD Vance may prove to have been a master stroke in this regard. Vance is the darling protégé of big tech billionaire, Peter Thiel. Thiel put up $15 million of his own money to ensure Vance got elected to the Ohio Senate. Far from the ‘working class’ spin Vance is made out to be, he’s actually bankrolled by big tech and finance money.

Vance’s rise is reminiscent of Obama’s, who was similarly pulled out of nowhere by the billionaire Chicago Pritzger family and spent just a few years in the Illinois state Senate minor league before Pritzger money called him to the majors and funded his US Senate seat and then push for the presidency. This is how big capital selects its representatives to highest levels of US government.

Thiel is also now a major player in the venture capitalist and private equity big money community. Many are throwing their wealth behind Trump now for the first time. The highly visible announcement by Tech billionaire Elon Musk to contribute $45 million a month to Trump’s campaign is only the tip of the Tech money machine iceberg. Scores more of big Tech and private equity (finance) have been announcing the same. The big Tech spigot may be shutting down for the Democrats, leaving them even more dependent on Hollywood, sports celebrities, and AIPAC the Israeli lobby.

It is likely the Democrats will now become even more dependent on AIPAC money in the campaign. Already pledging $100 million, AIPAC in return will insist on even more pro-Israel support from Harris and the Democrats between now and November. That will become apparent after Israel PM Netanyahu speaks to Congress soon. The timing of his appearance is not coincidental, any more than is his increasingly aggressive policies in the middle east.

Another development that may become more apparent in coming weeks is whether there is a split within the Democrat party. It is clear thus far that Obama and Nancy Pelosi have played a key role in the background in engineering Biden’s exit. It’s similarly clear that the Clintons and kingmaker James Clyburn did not join them, but were content to keep riding the Biden horse into the sunset. Obama and Pelosi statements this past week also suggest indirectly—or at least imply—they’d prefer to see an open convention; whereas Clyburn in particular wants to retain the ‘black’ candidate Kamala Harris. If fundraising lags between now and Chicago, more evidence of a split within the party may emerge.

Perhaps in the weeks ahead until the Democrats’ party convention in late August in Chicago, some of these questions may be answered. Meanwhile, Harris appears as the nominee heir apparent for the party. But much can, and likely will, happen in the interim. As the saying goes ‘it ain’t over until the fat lady sings’ and she’s waiting off stage, still in the wings, waiting for her cue.

Dr. Jack Rasmus
July 22, 2024